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ABSTRACT 
Objectives 
There is an increasing amount of evidence which suggests that the cognitive models of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder can be applied to children. However, until now only two 
studies have used an experimental design to investigate the causal links between 
cognitive processes and childhood OCD. Therefore, the initial aim of this study was to 
develop these studies in order to further investigate the inflated responsibility model of 
childhood OCD. The secondary aim of this study is to investigate the effect of child’s 
reassurance seeking on mother’s reassurance giving behaviour.  
Method 
This study used an experimental between subjects design adapted from previous 
experimental research with adults and children. 52 participants aged 9-11 were 
randomly assigned to either a high responsibility group or a control group. Dependent 
variables were perceived responsibility, anxiety, checking behaviours and reassurance 
seeking.  
Results 
After the manipulation, children in the high responsibility group reported higher 
perceived responsibility than those in the control group. There were no group 
differences in post-task anxiety, while controlling for baseline anxiety. Children in the 
high responsibility group took longer to complete the task and also checked, hesitated 
and sought more reassurance than those in the control group. Mothers with children in 
the high responsibility group did not provide more reassurance than those with children 
in the control group.  
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Conclusions 
The findings offer support for the link between inflated responsibility and childhood 
OCD by providing preliminary evidence for a causal link between inflated 
responsibility, checking behaviours and reassurance seeking. The study did not find a 
link between children’s reassurance seeking and mother’s reassurance giving 
behaviours.  There are a number of methodological limitations that need to be to be 
considered when interpreting the results. The findings are discussed in relation the 
implications for the cognitive model of OCD, treatment for young people with OCD 
and directions for future research.   
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
 The aim of this study is to investigate whether the inflated responsibility model 
of OCD (Salkovskis, 1985) applies to children. Although there is now a large body of 
evidence for the role of cognitive factors in the development and maintenance of OCD 
in adults (Ladouceur, et al., 1995, Wilson & Chambless, 1999), very few studies have 
investigated how well these cognitive models apply to children. Recently a number of 
studies have tried to address this issue; however there have been a number of 
methodological limitations. For example, the use of observational designs has meant 
that causal relationships between cognitive processes and obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms could not be established. Only two studies have used an experimental design 
to examine the causal relationship between perceived inflated responsibility and 
childhood OCD. The aim of this study is to replicate and extend this work while also 
examining the relationship between maternal reassurance giving and children’s 
reassurance seeking. Understanding whether the inflated responsibility model 
(Salkovskis, 1985) of OCD applies to children would have a number of clinical 
implications, such as improving the assessment and treatment of childhood OCD.  
 The introduction begins with an overview of childhood OCD including 
diagnostic criteria and epidemiology. It then goes on to discuss current theoretical 
approaches and treatment to childhood OCD including biological, behavioural and 
cognitive theories. Empirical evidence for adult cognitive models of OCD is reviewed 
with a specific focus on the Thought-Action Fusion, Meta-cognitive beliefs and the 
Inflated Responsibility model. The application of these models to children is then 
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discussed including a critique of available literature. Developmental and contextual 
issues in OCD are then discussed, ending with research aims, rationale and hypotheses.  
1.2 OCD in Childhood 
1.2.1 Diagnostic Criteria 
 The definition of OCD used in this study is in accordance with The Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Fourth Edition (DSM-IV; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000). This defines the essential features for diagnosis as 
recurrent obsessions and/or compulsions that cause marked distress, are time 
consuming, or interfere significantly with the person’s functioning. Obsessions are 
defined as intrusive thoughts, images or impulses that are experienced as inappropriate 
and are associated with marked anxiety or distress. Compulsions are defined as 
repetitive behaviours or mental acts that are completed in an attempt to neutralise or 
relieve anxiety, or to prevent a feared event from occurring.  
 Although symptoms of OCD in children are similar to that of adults, children 
can be diagnosed with OCD without having insight into the excessive or unrealistic 
nature of obsessions or compulsions. Research has also shown that certain obsessions 
and compulsions may be associated with a child’s stage of development (Ivarsson & 
Valderhaug, 2006). For example younger children more commonly report obsessions 
about contamination, aggression, symmetry or exactness (Geller et al., 1998; Riddel et 
al., 1990), whereas adolescents report obsessions that are more sexual or religious in 
nature (Williams and Waite, 2009). Children and adolescents also appear to have more 
aggressive/catastrophic obsessions and hoarding symptoms than adults (Geller et al., 
1998). This supports aspects of cognitive OCD theories which suggest that the content 
of obsessions are a reflection of the issues that are most pertinent to the individual at 
that time (Salkovskis, 1985). In line with adult OCD, compulsions in children have been 
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found to be both overt and covert in nature. Common overt compulsions in children 
include washing, cleaning, checking, ordering, touching, repeating and reassurance 
seeking whereas covert compulsions include cancelling thoughts, silent prayers or 
counting (Franklin et al., 1998). Compulsions can change throughout a child’s 
development and it is common for children to present with a number of different 
compulsions at any one time (Hanna, 1995).   
 Although it is more typical for children to display both obsessions and 
compulsions, some younger children have been found to engage in compulsions without 
reporting obsessions. This may be because children of this age lack the cognitive 
capacity to articulate internal processes (Swedo & Rapoport, 1989).  
1.2.2 Epidemiology, Onset, Course and Prognosis 
 1.2.2.1 Prevalence. Recent literature suggests that childhood OCD is more 
prevalent than once believed (March & Mule, 1998). Existing epidemiological studies 
of OCD in young people aged 18 years or under have reported prevalence rates of 0.1- 
4%; with relatively few of these studies including pubertal children (Flament et al., 
1988; Valleni-Basile et al., 1996; Douglass, Moffitt, Dar, McGhee & Silva, 1995; 
Zohar, 1999). Suggested reasons behind these discrepancies include age of subjects, 
culture, reluctance to disclose symptoms and lack of awareness of internal processes.  
 A recent epidemiological study carried out by the Office for National Statistics 
(1999) found the prevalence of OCD in children in the UK to be 0.25% (95% CI 0.12-
0.35). This is slightly lower than other studies (Heyman et al., 2001).  However, 17% of 
the families did not consent to take part which may mean that the prevalence is slightly 
under reported. Also, results suggested that the rate of OCD increases with age however 
this study only included children up to 15 years old compared to other studies that have 
included children up to 18 years old.  
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 Studies have also found that children and adolescents with OCD often go 
undiagnosed. For example, one found that only 4 out of 18 high school children that 
were found to have OCD had received professional care and none of those 18 had been 
correctly identified as suffering from OCD (Flament et al., 1988).  
 Heyman et al., (2001) showed a trend towards higher rates of OCD in ethnic 
minority groups in the UK. Higher prevalence of OCD was also found in children from 
families with lower average incomes and of lower social class (Heyman et al., 2001). 
This is in contrast with other studies that found no correlation with socio-economic 
status (Flament et al., 1988) or found that OCD is more prevalent in children of high 
social class (Hanna, 1995).  
 1.2.2.2 Age of onset, course and prognosis. The average age of onset for 
childhood OCD ranges from 7.5 to 12.5 years (Geller et al., 1998) with a mean of 10.3 
years. In 50-80% of cases, adults with OCD reported that the onset of their symptoms 
began before the age of 18 (Pauls, Alsobrook, Goodman, Rasmussen, & Leckman, 
1995). The age of onset appears to peak firstly in puberty and then in early adulthood 
(Pauls et al., 1995) with some studies suggesting that boys are more likely to have 
prepubertal onset whereas girls are more likely to have onset during adolescence 
(Swedo, Rapoport, Leanard & Lenane, 1989).  
 As with adults, the course of childhood OCD tends to fluctuate over time and is 
often chronic (Bolton, Luckie, & Steinberg, 1995). A study by Hanna (1995) 
investigated the onset of OCD symptoms in a clinical sample of 31 children and 
adolescents with OCD. Results showed that the onset of OCD symptoms most 
commonly happens over a period of a few years (55%) with the remaining emergence of 
symptoms happening over a few months (39%) or suddenly (6%). In terms of 
precipitating events, Rettew, Swedo, Leonard and Rapoport (1992) found that 38% of 
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youngsters (n=79) with OCD believed that incidents such as moving, media events and 
minor physical illnesses were associated with the onset of symptoms.  
 With regards to prognosis for OCD in childhood, Stewart et al. (2004) carried 
out a meta-analysis of twenty-two studies to investigate predictors and persistence of 
OCD. Findings indicated that persistence of OCD in childhood was not as high as 
previously thought, with 41% of the participants reporting a clinical level of OCD 
symptoms at follow up. However, as the authors note, a large number of the studies 
used in the meta-analyses lacked comprehensive psychosocial outcome measures 
making it difficult to know how much their symptoms were impacting on their quality 
of life. 
 Despite its limitations, this study confirms that paediatric OCD can be a chronic 
condition that persists into adulthood and highlights the importance of early recognition 
and treatment intervention. In addition to persistent OCD symptoms, children who have 
been diagnosed with OCD may be at increased risk of developing other anxiety or mood 
disorders in adulthood when compared to controls (Falment et al., 1990). 
1.2.3 Co-Morbidity and Subtypes of OCD 
 OCD in children and adolescents has specifically been associated with 
Tourette’s syndrome (TS; Thomsen & Mikkelson, 1995; Rapoport, 1986), and some 
studies have suggested they may be alternative manifestations of the same underlying 
illness (Pauls et al., 1995). However, the extent of this relationship appears to differ 
depending on the sample being addressed. Whereas OCD has been reported in up to 
42% of children diagnosed with TS (Apter et al., 1993), TS has been found in only 0% 
to 15% of those with OCD diagnosis (Zohar et al., 1992; Heyman et al, 2001; Douglass 
et al., 1995). Studies have also shown patients with OCD alone are more likely to have 
cleaning compulsions whereas those with both OCD and Tourette’s, have more 
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touching and blinking compulsions (Holzer, 1994). Other movement disorders on the 
spectrum of Tic Disorders have been found in 13% to 20% of youth with OCD (Hanna, 
1995; Zohar et al., 1992). Findings such as these have led to the view that tic-related 
and non-tic related OCD may be different subtypes of the disorder (Riddle et al., 1990).  
 With regards to co-morbidity, 60-80% of young people with OCD have at least 
one other psychiatric diagnosis (Hanna, 1995). According to the Britain nationwide 
survey of child mental health (Heyman et al., 2001), the most common are anxiety 
disorders, conduct disorder, depression and eating disorders (Heyman et al., 2001).  
Mancebo et al., (2008) reported that 25% of children with OCD met criteria for 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). 
  A number of studies have investigated the effect of co-morbidity on treatment 
outcomes. In terms of co-morbid anxiety disorders, O’Kearney, Anstey and Von Sanden 
(2009) found that CBT for OCD brought about a reduction in both OCD and anxiety 
symptoms. In terms of depression, only severe depression was found to negatively 
impact on treatment outcome, with studies showing that children with severe depression 
and co-morbid OCD had worse outcomes (Abramowitz & Foa, 2000, Goodyer et al., 
2007). The authors conclude that mild to moderate levels of depression may be a result 
of the OCD symptoms rather than a disorder in itself.  
1.2.4 Continuity with OCD in Adults 
 To date, only one study has examined current symptoms and lifetime correlates 
of juvenile-onset OCD across the lifespan. Mancebo et al., (2008) used a structured 
diagnostic interview, rater-administered severity measures and self report questionnaires 
to collect data from 257 participants with juvenile onset OCD (20 children, 44 
adolescents and 193 adults). Results showed that phenomenology of juvenile-onset 
OCD is similar across the lifespan and that regardless of age at presentation, individuals 
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report multiple types of obsessions and compulsions with similar themes. It therefore 
seems probable that our understanding of childhood OCD could be furthered by a better 
understanding of adult theoretical approaches.  
1.3 Theoretical Approaches and Treatment 
 A number of biological and psychological models have been developed to aid 
our understanding of childhood OCD. This section gives an overview of the most 
widely recognised theories and discusses how these theories inform treatment provision. 
The chapter begins with a brief summary of biological and pharmacological treatments. 
This is followed by a more detailed account of psychological models, with particular 
focus on cognitive and behavioural approaches.  
1.3.1 Biological Models  
 Biological models of OCD have focused on a number of different areas 
including brain structure and function, neuro-pharmacological, genetic and 
neuropsychology.  
 Neuro-pharmacological studies of OCD have focused on abnormalities in the 
serotonin and dopaminergic subsystems in the central nervous system, possibly in the 
areas of the basal ganglia and orbitofrontal cortex (Grados & Riddle, 1999). Studies 
investigating the serotonin hypothesis have suggested that it may be associated with 
hypersensitivity in the postsynaptic 5-HT receptors. This hypothesis has been supported 
by platelet studies that have found that positive treatment response is related to a 
decrease in serotonin levels and a reduction of 5-HT activity (Flament, Rapoport, 
Murphey, Berg & Lake, 1987).   
 Genetic factors have historically been thought of as important in the 
development of OCD; however literature in this area does not offer conclusive 
evidence. Black, Noyes, Goldstein and Blum (1992) found a low rate of OCD and a 
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relatively high rate of anxiety disorders in first degree relatives of adults with OCD. 
Pauls et al. (1995) found a higher rate of OCD and subthreshhold OCD in relatives of 
adults with OCD (10.3% and 7.9% respectively) compared to relatives of control 
patients (1.9% and 2.0% respectively). A more recent family study, involving 80 adults 
with OCD and 73 controls, showed significantly higher lifetime prevalence of OCD 
(11.7% vs. 2.7%), obsessions (10.4% vs. 2.4%) and compulsions (18.2% vs. 6.1%) in 
first degree relatives of adults with OCD compared to controls (Nestadt et al., 2000).  
 Childhood OCD studies have also found higher rates of OCD in close relatives 
of children with OCD than in close relatives of children with no diagnosis (Hanna, 
Himle, Curtis & Guillespie, 2005). Also, childhood studies have generally reported 
higher rates of OCD in first degree relatives than adult studies, suggesting that earlier 
age of onset is related to degrees of familiarity of OCD (Grados & Riddle, 1999). 
However, higher rates of OCD are not found in more distant relatives, suggesting that 
genetics only explain a small part of the development of OCD.  
 A recently published article investigated the influence of genetic factors of OCD 
by reviewing over 70 years of twin research (van Grootheest, Cath, Beekman, & 
Boomsma, 2005). They concluded that obsessive-compulsive symptoms are heritable, 
with genetic influences in the range of 45% to 65%. However, as the studies included in 
this paper spanned a considerable timeframe there were inconsistencies in the design 
and methodology used. It appears that although genetic factors may influence 
susceptibility of OCD, it is likely that environmental factors also play a large part in the 
development of OC symptoms.  
 1.3.1.1 Pharmacological treatments. Studies investigating the efficacy of 
pharmacological treatments for childhood OCD have consistently found a reduction in 
symptoms ranging from 30-40% (Geller et al., 2001; Riddle et al., 2001).  
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 In the UK the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) 
highlights that pharmacological treatments can be an effective in the treatment of OCD 
symptoms in children and young people, but that clinicians must be aware of the 
potential unknown risks involved, particularly in relation to the child’s developing 
nervous system (NICE, 2006). Therefore although selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors (SSRIs) should be considered as potentially effective treatments for this 
population, treatment decisions need to take the potential adverse effects of these drugs 
into account.  
 Given the strong evidence base for the effectiveness of therapeutic interventions 
in the treatment of OCD and the possible side effects of medication, it seems 
advantageous to offer other alternatives to medication when possible. This will be 
discussed in the next section.  
1.3.2 Behavioural Models of OCD 
 The origins of current behavioural treatment are found in learning theory. 
Behavioural models of OCD derive largely on Mowrer’s (1960) two-stage model of fear 
and avoidance. This model suggests that an individual becomes fearful of specific 
stimuli through classical conditioning and that this fear is maintained through operant 
conditioning. For example, a neutral object become associated with fear and anxiety 
through some negative event or stimuli and this fear and anxiety is reduced by engaging 
in some repetitive behaviour that is negatively reinforcing. These repetitive behaviours, 
known as compulsions, temporarily remove the aversive stimuli and relieve feelings of 
anxiety, which in turn strengthens the response and increases the likelihood that the 
compulsions will be carried out again. For example, a child who has fears around 
contamination may learn that by repeatedly washing his hands, their anxiety will 
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reduce. However, as this reduction in anxiety is short lived, it is usually not long before 
the cycle of distress and alleviation happens again.  
 Similarly, Rachman (1971) proposed that normal intrusive thoughts, images and 
impulses become associated with anxiety that has subsequently failed to extinguish. The 
failure to extinguish is said to occur because sufferers develop escape and avoidance 
behaviours (such as obsessional checking and washing) which prevent the anxiety 
becoming extinct (Rachman and Hodgson, 1980). For example, rather than exposing 
themselves to the feared stimuli and allowing the anxiety to pass, individuals avoid the 
stimuli by carrying out compulsive rituals, therefore not allowing themselves to become 
habituated to the intrusive thought. The avoidant activity is therefore strengthened by 
the process of operant conditioning.  
 In support of this model Rachman and his colleagues conducted a series of 
experiments. They found that; (1) the elicitation of obsessions was associated with 
increased anxiety and discomfort, (2) if the patients were allowed to ritualise then this 
anxiety and discomfort immediately decreased, (3) that if ritualising was delayed then 
the anxiety and discomfort decreased over a longer period and, (4) when the patient 
refrained from ritualising then the anxiety on the next trial was lower than during the 
previous trial and this did not occur if the ritualising took place (Rachman and Hodgson, 
1980). Similarly, other studies have found a link between covert compulsions and 
anxiety reduction among patients with OCD (Mark et al, 2000). The next section will 
discuss the treatment approaches for OCD based on these behavioural principles.  
 1.3.2.1 Exposure and response prevention (ERP). ERP is the most widely used 
psychological intervention for children, adolescents and adults with OCD (March, 
1995). It is based on behavioural principles and involves exposing the individual, either 
directly or through imagination, to the anxiety that is provoked by their obsessions 
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while also preventing the use of compulsions to reduce the anxiety. For example, 
children with compulsive washing would be required in a graded way to touch objects 
that they fear will lead to contamination, and prevent the washing that neutralises their 
fear (O’Kearney, Anstey, von Sanden, 2010). The idea is that over long periods of 
exposure, the individual will learn that they are able to tolerate the feared stimuli and 
that the anxiety will pass without needing to engage in the compulsion. This cycle of 
exposure and response prevention is repeated until the individual becomes habituated to 
the feared stimuli, and learns that even when the compulsions are not carried out, the 
feared catastrophe does not occur (Albano, Knox & Barlow, 1995).  
 A large body of evidence exists for the efficacy of ERP in adult populations 
(Abramowitz, Whiteside & Deacon, 2005); however the effectiveness of ERP alone for 
OCD in childhood and adolescents is still debatable.  
 Bolton and Perrin (2008) compared a 5 week ERP treatment programme (ERP 
alone without the cognitive components involved in CBT) with a wait list control in 20 
children and adolescents with OCD. Children were randomised to ERP or wait-list 
condition. Children assigned to the treatment group showed a significant improvement 
in symptoms compared with controls, and this was maintained 14 weeks later. This 
study suggests that ERP is an effective treatment for paediatric OCD even when 
delivered over a relatively short period of time, which is consistent with previous 
studies (Franklin et al., 1998). However, due to the small sample size, these findings 
should be interpreted with caution. Also, the assessor was not blind to treatment 
outcome which could mean that the investigator-based outcome ratings were influenced 
by the researcher’s expectation of change in the treatment outcome group vs. no change 
in the control group (Bolton & Perrin, 2008).  
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 In the treatment of OCD, ERP is often incorporated as part of cognitive 
behavioural intervention. This section will therefore discuss studies that examine 
efficiency of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) for the treatment of paediatric OCD. 
O’Kearney et al. (2010) reviewed 8 randomised controlled treatment trials involving 
343 participants 18 years or younger. ERP was part of all the CBT interventions 
reviewed. Results from two studies suggest that combining CBT with medication 
produces better outcomes than medication alone (Pediatric Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder Treatment study: POTS, 2004; Neziroglu et al, 2000). However, sample sizes 
from both studies were small and therefore results should be interpreted with caution. 
Two studies compared CBT to wait list control (Barret, Healy-Farrell & March, 2004; 
Bolton & Perrin, 2008) and two against a placebo control (Freeman et al, 2008; POTS, 
2004). CBT was more effective than wait list control, pharmacotherapy and 
psychological placebo at reducing the severity of OCD symptoms.  
  These studies support CBT (with ERP) as an effective treatment for OCD in 
children and adolescents. However, other studies report high drop out rates of up to 
48% and suggest that a large number of children find the ERP approach to be aversive 
and demanding (Bolton & Perrin, 2008; Allsopp & Verduyn, 1990). CBT for OCD has 
been modelled on OCD for adults (Turner, 2006). Further research is needed to gain a 
better understanding of the cognitive processes relevant to OCD in children and 
adolescents as this will be vital in the developing and refining of treatments.  
1.3.3 Cognitive Models of OCD 
  All cognitive models of OCD are based on the idea that intrusive thoughts are a 
very normal every day experience and occur in almost 90% of the general population 
(Salkovskis, 1985). The significance lies in the way in which intrusive thoughts are 
interpreted and it has been proposed that individuals with OCD may have a tendency to 
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misinterpret these intrusive thoughts as dangerous and catastrophic thereby 
transforming them into ‘abnormal’ obsessions (Rachman, 1997). A number of cognitive 
models of OCD in adults have been proposed. These include inflated responsibility 
(Salkovskis, 1999), thought-action fusion (TAF; Rachman, 1993) and meta-cognitive 
beliefs (Wells and Papageorgiou 1998). Each of these models assume that an 
individual’s appraisal of their obsessional thoughts and their response to such thoughts 
contribute to OCD. However, each model emphasizes different types of beliefs and 
some unique processes in the development and maintenance of OCD.  
 1.3.3.1. Thought-action fusion (TAF). TAF refers to the tendency to treat 
thoughts and actions as equivalents.  According to Rachman and Shafran (1999), TAF is 
a cognitive distortion with two components. The first is ‘probability TAF’ in which the 
intrusive thought is believed to increases the possibility of the specific negative event 
occurring in reality. The second is ‘morality TAF’ in which the individual believes that 
experiencing the intrusive thought is morally equivalent to carrying out the imagined 
action. This cognitive distortion may lead to feelings of guilt and increased distress 
which in turn may lead to attempts to neutralise these feelings.  
Empirical evidence for TAF 
  Rassin, Merkelbach, Muris and Spann (1999) conducted a randomised 
experimental study of TAF. Participants were wired to EEG apparatus. Those in the 
experimental condition were told that the apparatus could tell when they thought of the 
word apple and that this would result in an electrical shock being administered to 
another person. Participants in the control group were not given information about the 
electric shock. After 15 minutes participants completed questionnaires about the 
frequency and aversiveness of the target thought. Individuals in the experimental group 
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reported a higher frequency of intrusions, more discomfort, more self-directed anger 
and more resistance than the control group.  
 Zucker, Craske, Barrios and Holguin (2002) investigated whether or not a brief 
educational intervention delivered before an anxiety provoking task was effective at 
reducing anxiety in 72 high school students.  Each child was randomly assigned to 
either the experimental group, during which they received an educational message about 
intrusive thoughts and TAF, or a control condition who received a placebo message 
about stress. They were then asked to complete the sentence, ‘I hope_____ is in a car 
accident’, inserting a name of a relative or close friend in the blank and then close their 
eyes and think about the situation for a few moments. Findings showed that students in 
the experimental group reported less post task anxiety when compared to a control 
group.  
 Both studies suggest that the appraisal of intrusive thoughts influences levels of 
distress and neutralising which in turn supports cognitive models of OCD. However, it 
is important to note that both studies used non-clinical samples and that the question of 
whether TAF plays a significant role in OCD of clinical samples is currently less well 
established.  
 Barrett and Healy (2002) measured ratings of TAF, appraisal of responsibility, 
probability, severity, self doubt and cognitive control in a group of children with OCD 
and compared them to a group of anxious and non-clinical children. To assess TAF, 
children were asked to complete three multiple choice questions. For OCD children they 
were asked to complete the sentence ‘If I think__________’  by replacing the blank 
with the child’s most intrusive thought and then choosing one of three possible endings; 
(a) probably nothing bad will happen, (b) something bad might happen or (c) something 
bad will happen for sure. Children in the anxious and control group were given a 
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standardised thought. Results showed that children with OCD reported significantly 
higher cognitive perceptions of TAF in comparison to the non-clinical children; 
however children in the OCD group and anxiety group did not differ. The authors noted 
that the similarity in OCD and anxious children may be because a large number of the 
anxious children reported that the OCD-relevant threat was true for them, indicating that 
they may have been experiencing some degree of OC symptoms. 
 1.3.3.2 The meta-cognitive beliefs model. Meta-cognition refers to beliefs and 
knowledge about strategies used to control and regulate thinking processes (Moses & 
Baird, 1998). This model focuses on the individual’s beliefs about the significance and 
meaning of intrusive thoughts (Fisher & Wells, 2005). According to Wells (2000), OCD 
is maintained by two feedback loops. The first feedback loop focuses on the negative 
emotional feelings that arise from the appraisal of the thought, such as anxiety 
symptoms being interpreted as a sign of loss of control. Emotional responses increase 
the likelihood of further intrusions. The second feedback loop focuses on the 
behavioural response, which prevents disconfirmation of the dysfunctional beliefs. The 
non-occurrence of the catastrophic event is attributed to the ritual and not to the fact that 
the appraisal of the intrusion is not correct (Wells, 1997).  
Empirical evidence for the metacognitive beliefs model 
 Results from a number of questionnaire based studies have shown empirical 
support for the meta-cognitive model by showing that meta-cognitive beliefs are 
associated with O-C symptoms (Wells & Papageaorgiou, 1998). 
 Gwilliam, Wells and Cartwright Hatton (2004) used a battery of questionnaires 
to investigate whether OCD symptom severity in adults was better predicted by meta-
cognitive beliefs or responsibility beliefs. Results showed that responsibility and meta-
cognitive beliefs are positively correlated, that the relationship between responsibility 
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and OC symptoms was statistically dependent on meta-cognitions and that meta-
cognitions positively correlated with OC symptoms independently of responsibility. 
Metacognitive beliefs about the need to control thoughts, thought-action fusion and 
negative beliefs about cognitive competence were reliable predictors of OC symptoms. 
However, only one measure of inflated responsibility was included in this study and 
therefore important aspects of this construct may have been missed.  
 Fisher and Wells (2005) compared the effects of brief ERP (ERP-E), delivered 
with a metacognitive rational, with the effects of brief ERP accompanied by a 
traditional habituation rational in eight patients referred to a clinical psychology service 
for OCD. Metacognitive beliefs were elicited by asking each patient about the meaning 
and dangers of their intrusions. Participants were then subjected to a brief five minute 
exposure to their feared obsessional stimuli. They were asked to focus on the 
obsessional stimuli and not to engage in any form of neutralising behaviours. Before the 
task was repeated participants in the metacognitive condition were given a 
metacognitive rational (Wells; 1997). In the habituation condition, an ERP rational was 
provided after the task had been repeated (Andrews et al., 2003). Results from a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that brief ERP accompanied by a meta-cognitive 
treatment rational resulted in significantly greater reductions of anxiety/distress (z=-
2.03, p<.05), meta-cognitive beliefs (z=-2.52, p<.05) and the urge to neutralize (z=-
1.963, p<.05), than brief ERP accompanied by a habitual rational. 
 Fisher and Wells (2008) evaluated a new form of cognitive therapy called 
Metacognitive therapy (MCT) which is based on Well’s meta-cognitive model of OCD. 
MCT differs from standard CBT and ERP by focusing exclusively on metacognitive 
beliefs about obsessions and compulsions. It does not utilize habituation strategies or 
require in session exposure to obsessions. Treatment efficacy was assessed using single 
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case methodology in 4 patients with different OCD representations. MCT was delivered 
weekly for 12-14 weeks with each session lasting no more than one hour. Outcome 
measures included the Yale Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; Goodman 
et al, 1989), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock & 
Erbaugh, 1961) and the Padua Inventory (PI; Sanavio, 1988). Results showed 
substantial reductions were obtained on all of the outcome measures at post-treatment 
and at three month and six month follow up, including changes on metacognitive beliefs 
about obsessions and compulsions. Percentage improvements for pre- to post on the Y-
BOCS ranged from 63% to 75% and percentage improvements on the PI ranged from 
50% to 86%. The author discuss a number of limitations of the study including small 
sample size, the fact that the study relied heavily on self-report measures and did not 
have an independent assessment of treatment outcome (Fisher & Wells, 2008).  
 1.3.3.3. The inflated responsibility model. Salkovskis proposed that inflated 
responsibility is central to the development and maintenance of OCD (Salkovskis, 
1999). The inflated responsibility model proposes that rather than dismissing normal 
intrusive thoughts as trivial, OCD sufferers are more likely to misinterpret the intrusions 
as indicating that danger is imminent and feel that they are personally responsible for 
preventing any potential harm that may occur as a result of that threat (Parrish & 
Radomsky, 2006). Responsibility was defined as the belief that one has the pivotal 
power to bring about or prevent subjectively crucial negative outcomes. These events 
may be actual, that is, having consequences in the real world, and/or at a moral level 
(Salkovskis, Shafran, Rachman, & Freeston, 1999). In line with other cognitive models 
of anxiety, the inflated responsibility model (Salkovskis et al., 2000) proposes that core 
beliefs and assumptions develop from early experiences. These assumptions may be 
activated by a critical incident and may lead to the misinterpretation of normal intrusive 
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thoughts as dangerous. The misinterpretation of these intrusions leads to increased 
levels of anxiety and discomfort which in turn leads to increased levels of anxiety- 
neutralizing behaviour (Parrish & Radomsky, 2006). These anxiety-neutralising 
behaviours can either be neutralising actions such as checking, reassurance seeking or 
rituals, or counterproductive safety strategies such as avoidance and thought 
suppression (Salkovskis et al., 2000). Although these behaviours serve to reduce anxiety 
in the short term, they prevent the individual from testing out their misinterpretation and 
therefore reinforce the compulsive behaviours in the long term.  The impact of 
reassurance seeking will be discussed in more detail later on in the chapter.  
Empirical evidence for the inflated responsibility model 
 There is increasing evidence that there is an association between inflated 
responsibility and OCD in adults. OCD patients and non-patients with OCD symptoms 
tend to score higher on measures of responsibility (e.g. Freeston, Ladouceur, Gagnon, & 
Thibodeau, 1993). Experimental studies have found that increases in perceived 
responsibility are followed by increased checking (Ladouceur et al., 1995) and that 
inducing responsibility in non-clinical adults leads to an increase in OCD-like 
behaviours compared to control participants (Bouchard et al., 1999, Ladouceur, 
Rheaume & Aublet, 1997).  
 Salkovskis et al. (2000) investigated the links between clinical symptoms 
(depression, obsessionality and anxiety) and responsibility beliefs using a variety of 
questionnaires including the Responsibility Attitude Scale (RAS), Responsibility 
Interpretation Questionnaire (RIQ), depression and anxiety measures.  Measures were 
administered to three groups: an anxiety sample; an OCD sample and; a non-clinical 
control group. Results showed that patients with OCD were more likely to have 
responsibility beliefs and assumptions compared to individuals in the other two groups. 
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Individuals in the OCD groups were also more likely to make responsibility-related 
appraisals of intrusive thoughts about possible harm (Salkovskis et al; 2000). These 
results suggest that inflated responsibility beliefs are more prominent in OCD sufferers 
than in general anxiety disorders or non-clinical controls.  
 A number of studies have aimed to demonstrate the link between different levels 
of perceived responsibility and OCD behaviours by experimentally manipulating 
responsibility in non-clinical subjects. Ladouceur et al., (1995) randomly assigned 40 
participants to high responsibility (HR) and low responsibility (LR) groups. In the HR 
group subjects were asked to sort two hundred pharmaceutical capsules by colour and 
told that their work would directly influence treatment safety for a widespread virus in a 
South East Asian country. Individuals in the LR group were asked to complete the same 
task but were told that the study was interested in perception of colour alone. 
Participants from the HR group showed significantly more hesitations and checking 
behaviours than subjects from the LR group. They also reported higher levels of anxiety 
and were more worried about the possibility of making a mistake.  
 Based on Ladouceur et al’s (1995) study, Arntz, Voncken and Goosen (2007) 
tested the causal status of responsibility in OCD by experimentally manipulating 
responsibility in a clinical sample. OCD patients, non-OCD anxiety controls and non-
patients were assigned to either a HR or LR condition and asked to complete 
classification task. Results showed that checking behaviours and subjective OCD like 
experiences were higher in OCD patients in the HiRes condition than all other groups. 
Previous studies using clinical samples have found similar results, where responsibility 
was manipulated by the presence or absence of an experimenter during a task (Lopatka 
& Rachman, 1995; Shafran, 1997). These results suggest that there is a link between 
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perceived responsibility and checking behaviour and that reduced responsibility is 
associated with reduced levels of anxiety.  
 1.3.3.4. Cognitive therapy. The aim of cognitive therapy in the treatment of 
OCD is to challenge and restructure the unhelpful thoughts that are maintaining OCD 
symptoms. However, very few studies have investigated the efficacy of pure cognitive 
therapy alone. On comparing ‘pure’ cognitive therapy with ‘pure’ ERP, Van Oppen et 
al., (1995) found that both resulted in symptomatic improvement, with significantly 
more ‘recovered’ patients in the cognitive therapy group. However, it is important to 
note that in 10 out of the 16 sessions, behavioural experiments were used as part of the 
cognitive therapy group. Although different rationales are used for behavioural 
experiments and ERP, the two are very similar in that behavioural experiments often 
involve anxiety provoking situations in which the usual compulsive response is altered 
to test an alternative hypothesis. Therefore, results from this study should be interpreted 
with caution (Carlstedt, 2009). In contrast, Cottraux (2001) found no significant 
difference in outcome measures between those treated with ERP and those treated by 
cognitive therapy.  
 Other studies comparing group CBT to group ERP have found group ERP to be 
marginally more effective (McLean et al., 2001). The authors discuss the importance of 
considering optimal formats for the delivery of different types of treatment. For 
example, the nature of ERP may mean that a group setting is more appropriate whereas 
the challenging of thoughts and beliefs, which may be more specific to the individual, 
could be more effectively done through individual CBT (McLean et al., 2001). Wittal, 
Thordarson, and McLean (2005) compared individual ERP with individual CBT, and 
found that there was no significant difference. This suggests that CBT on an individual 
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level is equally as effective as individual ERP and may be a good alternative for patients 
who are unwilling to engage in ERP (Salkovskis & Warrick, 1986).  
 Based on these findings, it seems possible that cognitive therapy could also be 
an effective treatment for OCD in children and adolescents. Indeed, a number of 
cognitive therapy techniques, such as cognitive restructuring (March et al., 2001) and 
thought stopping (Ownby, 1983), have been used as part of child treatment programmes 
for OCD. However, these techniques are usually incorporated as part of a wider 
intervention, such as ERP, rather than on their own (Turner, 2006).  
 Using a case series of six adolescents, Williams, Salkovskis, Forrester, and 
Allsopp (2002) found that cognitive strategies such as reappraising responsibility were 
effective in reducing OCD symptom severity. These findings have been supported by 
other case studies who also found that cognitive techniques can effectively reduce OCD 
symptoms in adolescents (Freeston, 2001, Shaffran & Somers, 1998). 
 Although these findings are useful in guiding treatment and research, further 
studies are needed to investigate the different processes involved in effective treatment.   
1.3.4. Summary: Evidence for Cognitive Models of OCD 
 All three of the cognitive models described above propose that intrusive 
thoughts are a normal everyday occurrence and that it is the misinterpretation and 
appraisal of these intrusive thoughts that is critical to development and maintenance of 
OCD. The TAF model (Rachman & Shafran, 1998) describes a phenomenon whereby 
people regard their thoughts to be equivalent to an imagined action whereas Wells 
(1997) proposed a model that focuses on meta-cognitive beliefs. Salkovskis (1985) on 
the other hand states that responsibility appraisals are the central component.  
 There is some evidence for each of the models but the most widely researched is 
the inflated responsibility model (Salkovskis, 1985). It is widely accepted that further 
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research is required in this field. The applicability of this model to a childhood 
population will be investigated further in the next section.  
1.4 The Application of Cognitive Models of OCD to Children 
 While it is generally accepted that cognitive models of OCD may be applied to 
children many questions remain unanswered. The following section will review the 
available literature and will provide a critique of the findings. It will do this by 
evaluating the methodology used in the studies and will be organised according to 
research design and sample.  
1.4.1 Literature Search 
Relevant articles for this literature review were identified by searching the 
following electronic databases on April 2010:  Cochrane Library, Ingenta, MEDLINE, 
PsycINFO (OCLC), Science Direct (Elsevier), EMBASE, Web of Science, Web of 
Knowledge and UEA Catalogue.  All available years were examined. The studies were 
initially identified by keyword, title and abstract searches using the following terms: 
‘adolescent or child* or juvenile or young people or paediatric’, in combination with ‘ 
obsessive compulsive or OCD’, ‘cognitive processes or cognitive models or cognitive 
appraisals’, ‘metacognitive beliefs or metacognitions’, ‘responsib*’, ‘magical thinking’ 
and ‘thought-action fusion’. The abstracts were screened to identify those of relevance 
to the current review.  During the search it became apparent that there were a number of 
key authors (e.g. ‘Barret’, ‘Shafran’, ‘Salkovskis’, ‘Rachman’, ‘Farrell’, and ‘Freeston’) 
and therefore author searches were also carried out. This was supplemented by a hand 
search through key journals and by following up references listed in relevant papers 
over the past ten years. The search was limited to articles printed in the English 
language and duplicates were removed. Colleagues working in the field of OCD were 
also consulted.  
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1.4.2 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria  
 The articles included in this review were (1) studies written in English and 
published in peer review articles; (2) studies where the exploration of cognitive models 
of OCD was the main focus, including inflated responsibility, meta-cognitive and TAF 
models; (3) studies using clinical or non-clinical populations and (4) studies using child 
populations up to 18 years of age.   
 Using the method described above, 138 papers were identified with a total of 12 
articles meeting the inclusion criteria. Two additional papers were also critically 
evaluated (Reeves, Reynolds, Wilson & Coker, 2010; Reynolds, Austin & Parker, 
submitted) as this study aims to extend and replicate these studies. The papers have 
been organised into three main categories based on three most prominent cognitive 
models of OCD. Within each category the papers have been further organised based on 
sample (e.g. clinical or non-clinical) and research design (e.g. questionnaire or 
experimental).  
1.4.3 Studies investigating TAF 
 1.4.3.1 Non-clinical samples and questionnaire designs. Muris, Meesters, 
Rassin, Merckelbach, and Campbell (2001) investigated the TAF model using a large 
non-clinical sample (n=427) of adolescents. Participants were asked to complete the 
Thought-Action-Fusion Questionnaire for Adolescents (TAFQ-A) and scales measuring 
symptoms of OCD, trait anxiety, other anxiety disorders and depression. The TAF-Q 
was a reliable measure for assessing both the morality and probability component of 
TAF. TAF was related to OCD symptoms and also with symptoms of other anxiety 
disorders and depression. However, when controlling for levels of trait anxiety, TAF 
was most strongly associated with symptoms of OCD, suggesting that TAF is more 
relevant to OCD than for any other anxiety disorders. The authors noted a number of 
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limitations of the study such as using a non-clinical sample and that the correlational 
nature of the study does not provide evidence for any kind of causal association between 
TAF and OCD symptoms.  
 Bolton, Dearsley, Madronal-Luque, and Baron-Cohen (2002) developed a 
Magical Thinking Questionnaire (MTQ) to investigate the relationship between magical 
thinking and OC symptoms in children between aged between 5-17 (n=127). They 
hypothesised that magical thinking would lessen between young childhood and late 
adolescents. There was a significant relationship between magical thinking and OC 
symptoms suggesting that the TAF model is applicable to children. However, magical 
thinking did not appear to decline with age but rather showed a more fluctuating pattern.  
 Evans, Milanak, Madeiros, and Ross (2002) conducted a structured interview on 
thirty-one children aged 3-8 years looking at their beliefs about tricks, wishes and 
magic. The children were also asked to watch a collection of magic tricks/ illusions and 
invited to explain how they think they worked. The children’s parents completed the 
Childhood Routines Inventory (CRI) which aimed to assess the children’s ‘compulsive-
like’ behaviours (habits, rituals and sensory perceptual experiences). Results from the 
study showed that the children’s magical beliefs were associated with their rituals and 
compulsions. In support of Bolton’s findings, no association was found between age 
and magical thinking. However, these results should be interpreted with caution as 
cognitive processes and development in a non-clinical sample may differ to those in a 
clinical sample.  
1.4.4 Studies Investigating the Meta-Cognitive Model 
 1.4.4.1 Non-clinical samples questionnaire designs. Cartwight-Hatton et al. 
(2004) developed the Meta-cognitive Questionnaire for Adolescents (MCQ-A) and 
investigated the prevalence and emotional correlates of meta-cognitions in adolescents.  
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The MCQ-A, along with measures of anxiety, depression and obsessional symptoms 
was administered to 177 school children aged 13-17. The results showed that the full 
range of meta-cognitive beliefs that have been identified in adult populations were also 
found in adolescents and that these beliefs (as measured on the MCQ-A) are positively 
correlated with self-reports of emotional symptoms. The authors concluded that meta-
cognitive beliefs may have a role to play in the development of emotional disorders; 
however, due to the nature of the study, this does not represent a causal association.  
 Mather and Cartwright-Hatton (2004) investigated the relationship between 
responsibility attitudes, metacognitive beliefs and OC symptoms by asking 166 young 
people aged 13-17 to complete a number of questionnaires. Both responsibility attitudes 
and meta-cognitions were found to be important correlates of OC symptoms. However, 
when age, gender and depression were controlled for only meta-cognition was a 
predictor of OCD.  
 The authors noted a number of methodological limitations. Firstly, as response 
rates were not calculated it is unclear how representative the sample is. Secondly, the 
use of non-clinical participants does mean that it is difficult to generalise the research to 
a clinical population. However, an advantage of using non-clinical sample in the 
research of anxiety disorders is that it allows studies to have adequate power to test 
relationships between variables. Thirdly, the authors questioned the validity of the 
measurements in regards to this age range and questioned poor test-retest reliability for 
one of the metacognitions questionnaire subscales.  
 Matthews, Reynolds and Derisley (2007) investigated inflated responsibility 
(Salkovskis, 1985), thought action fusion (Rachman, 1993) and meta-cognitive beliefs 
(Well and Matthews, 1994) in adolescents and looked at the relationships of these 
different cognitive processes to OC symptoms. In their study 233 participants aged 13 
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to 16 completed measures of inflated responsibility, TAF, meta-cognitive beliefs and 
obsessive compulsive symptoms. These variables accounted for 35% of the variance in 
OC symptoms and inflated responsibility and meta-cognitive beliefs both made 
significant independent contribution to OC symptoms. Inflated responsibility 
completely mediated the effect of TAF and partially mediated the effects of meta-
cognitive beliefs. This supports Salkovskis model (1985) who suggested that 
responsibility is a central feature of OCD. The authors concluded that cognitive models 
of OCD appear to be as applicable to children as they do to adults and that the measures 
used to assess cognition are appropriate for this age group.  
 These results are inconsistent with the findings from Mather and Cartwright-
Hatton’s study (2004) who reported that responsibility attitudes did not make a 
significant independent contribution to OC symptoms. The authors note that one 
important difference between the two studies is that Marther and Cartwright-Hatton 
(2004) controlled for depression before examining the impact of responsibility attitudes 
and meta-cognitions. The authors conclude that in order to clarify different predictors of 
OC symptoms it is important for future studies to examine the role of mood, as well as 
cognitions.  
 The use of a non-clinical sample does mean that generalizing to a clinical 
population is problematic as different relationships may exist between mood, OCD and 
cognitive appraisals. However there are also a number of clear advantages to using non-
clinical samples, including the relative ease with which these samples can be recruited, 
allowing studies to have adequate power to test relationships between variables. The use 
of a non-clinical sample also means that ethical and practical constraints can also be 
avoided (Gibbs, 1996) and also means that there are fewer competing factors (e.g. 
medication) that can influence the interpretation of the findings (Costello, 1994). 
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1.4.5 Studies Investigating the Inflated Responsibility Model   
 1.4.5.1 Clinical samples and experimental designs.  Barrett and Healy-Farrell 
(2003) experimentally manipulated perceived responsibility in 43 children with OCD 
during a behavioural avoidance task (BAT) and examined the impact of this 
manipulation on perceived probability and severity of harm, distress, ritualizing and 
avoidance. The BAT was an individually tailored test during which the child was asked 
to expose themselves for 5 minutes to a situation that usually caused significant distress. 
Based on adult studies by Lopatka and Rachman (1995) and Shafran (1997), 
responsibility was manipulated by varying the presence of others during the BAT and 
by using signed contracts between the child and experimenter. Each participant engaged 
in three experimental conditions: high, moderate and low responsibility. The study then 
examined if CBT would decrease ratings across all measures during a BAT. Inflated 
responsibility did not lead to increased ratings of distress or of probability or severity of 
harm. Following CBT, there were no significant reductions across measures during the 
BAT.  
 This study has a number of strengths which include the experimental design and 
the use of an age appropriate adaptation of an established manipulation task. However, a 
number of limitations are also apparent. As noted by the authors, participants were 
particularly reluctant to accept responsibility in the high-responsibility BAT condition. 
Results also showed that the manipulation of responsibility did not result in a significant 
difference in responsibility ratings between low and moderate BAT conditions.  
 1.4.5.2 Non-clinical samples and experimental designs. Only two studies have 
used experimental designs to investigate cognitive models of OCD in a non-clinical 
sample of children (Reeves et al., 2010; Reynolds et al., submitted).  
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 Reeves et al. (2010) aimed to investigate whether Salkovskis’ (1985) inflated 
responsibility model of OCD applied to children by using a sample of non-clinical 9-12 
year olds (n=81). Children were randomly allocated to one of three conditions: an 
inflated responsibility group, a moderate responsibility group and a reduced 
responsibility group. In all three groups children were asked to sort sweets according to 
whether they had nuts in or not. Responsibility was induced by telling the children that 
the sweets would be given to a group of children, where one child had a nut allergy. 
This is an adaptation of a sorting task that was developed by Ladouceur et al. (1995), to 
manipulate responsibility in adults. Children in the high responsibility group were told 
that the experimenter would not check the sweets after they had been sorted and 
therefore it was important that the children sorted them as carefully as possible. 
Children in the moderate responsibility group were not given any information about 
whether the sorted sweets would be checked or not. Children in the reduced 
responsibility group were told that their work would be checked by the researcher and 
therefore mistakes would not be their fault. The effect of the manipulation was 
examined on several dependent variables: number of checks, number of hesitations, 
time taken to complete the task and level of anxiety. Results showed that as perceived 
responsibility increased, children checked and hesitated more often and took longer to 
complete the task. Groups did not differ in self-reported state anxiety.  
 This study has a number of strengths. For example, the use of an experimental 
design meant that the possible causal role of OCD could be inferred. The authors also 
adapted a previously used experimental task resulting in it being appropriate for use 
with children of this age. The experimental task also had good face validity.  
A limitation of the study is the lack of a control group.  
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 Reynolds et al., (submitted) attempted to address these shortcomings by 
replicating and extending the study by Reeves et al. (2010). The extension included the 
addition of a control group in which children were not given any responsibility as well 
as an inflated responsibility group and a reduced responsibility group. In line with the 
inflated responsibility model of OCD (Salkovskis et al., 2000), reassurance seeking was 
also added as another type of OCD-like behaviour. Sixty-nine children aged 9-11 
participated in the study. Inflated responsibility increased reassurance seeking and also 
increased the time taken to complete the task. Unexpectedly, state anxiety, number of 
checks or hesitations did not increase with increased responsibility. Results also showed 
that although the sorting task was successful in manipulating responsibility between the 
high and reduced responsibility groups, the control group did not differ significantly 
from either of the experimental groups in post-task perceived levels of responsibility  
 This study has a number of strengths such as the inclusion of reassurance 
seeking and the use of reliable and valid questionnaires to measure possible 
confounding variables. The use of non-clinical samples allows investigations into the 
causes of OCD. 
 1.4.5.3 Non-clinical samples and questionnaire designs. Magnusdottir and 
Smari (2004) investigated the relationship between responsibility attitudes and OC 
symptoms in 202 non-clinical children aged 10 to 14. Results of a hierarchical 
regression showed that responsibility attitudes correlated moderately with OC 
symptoms and were a stronger predictor of OCD symptoms than were symptoms of 
depression. This indicates that responsibility attitudes have a specific relationship with 
OC symptoms.  
 Yorulmaz, Altin and Karanci (2008) investigated responsibility attitudes and 
obsessive compulsive symptom clusters in two samples of adolescents aged 16 to 20 
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years (n=380) and university students aged 18 to 29 years (n=378; age range 18-29) 
from Turkey. Responsibility had two dimensions based on self-dangerousness and 
prevention and was a strong predictor of OCD checking symptoms; adolescents 
reported more responsibility compared to university students. The dimensions of 
responsibility were correlated with different symptom clusters in OCD. For example, 
cleaning rituals were more associated with responsibility based on preventing danger to 
self or others whereas obsessive thinking was based on the self- dangerousness of the 
intrusive thoughts.  People who had high scores in checking emphasised both factors of 
responsibility, supporting the importance of the role of responsibility in checking (e.g. 
Rachman, 2002). The use of non-clinical sample means that any generalisation to 
children with OCD is tentative.  
 As noted by the authors the study also highlights consistency in responsibility 
concerns among different cultures, as responsibility attitudes in the Turkish sample 
were similar to those found in young adults from elsewhere (Libby et al., 2004; Mather 
and Cartwright- Hatton, 2004). A strength of this study is that it has a relatively large 
sample size however the correlational nature of the study means that the results cannot 
be used to infer a causal relationship between the variables.  
1.4.6 Studies Investigating more than one Cognitive Model 
 1.4.6.1 Clinical sample and questionnaire designs. As mentioned in 1.3.3.1, 
Barrett and Healy (2003) investigated cognitive appraisals of responsibility, probability 
and severity of harm, TAF, self-doubt and cognitive control in 59 children aged 7-13. 
Out of the 59 children, 28 had a primary diagnosis of OCD, 17 had another anxiety 
disorder and 14 had no diagnosis. Children with OCD reported significantly higher 
ratings of responsibility, severity, thought action fusion and less cognitive control than 
non-clinical children. Children with OCD only differed from anxious children on 
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ratings of cognitive control. The authors noted that a limitation of the study is the 
relatively small sample size resulting in insignificant power to detect group differences. 
The use of a clinical sample is a strength.  
 Farrell and Barrett (2006) investigated developmental differences in the 
cognitive processing of threat in a sample of children (n=36; aged 6-11), adolescents 
(n=37; aged 12-17) and adults (n=38, aged 18-66) with OCD. Results from self report 
questionnaires and an idiographic cognitive assessment task (also used by Barrett and 
Healy, 2003) showed that children reported experiencing less intrusive thoughts which 
were less uncontrollable and less distressing than the thoughts experienced by 
adolescents and adults. Perceived severity of harm, cognitive appraisals of TAF, 
cognitive control and self-doubt were similar across the age groups whereas thought 
suppression strategies, probability biases and responsibility attitudes were higher in 
adolescents and adults. The authors suggested that TAF may be more closely associated 
with the development in childhood OCD whereas other cognitive factors such as 
responsibility might develop as a consequence of other OC symptoms or at later 
developmental stages. However due to the small sample size, the possibility for a Type 
II error is increased and therefore results should be interpreted with caution.  
 Libby et al., (2004) examined  responsibility (RAS; Salkovskis et al., 2000), 
TAF (Thought-Action- Fusion Scale; Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman, 1996) and 
perfectionism (Multidimneational Perfectionism Scale; Frost, Marten, Luhart & 
Rosenblate, 1990) in 11-18 year olds with OCD (n=28); other types of anxiety disorders 
(n=28) and a non-clinical group (n=62). Young people with OCD had significantly 
higher scores on TAF, inflated responsibility and one aspect of perfectionism (concern 
over mistakes) than the other groups and inflated responsibility was the only significant 
predictor of OCD. This supports Salkovskis et al.’s (1999) proposition that inflated 
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responsibility is associated with OCD in young people. In contrast to Farrell and Barrett 
(2006), these findings also indicate that young people with OCD hold similar cognitive 
appraisals to adults with the disorder.  However, the authors note that there may be 
possible developmental shifts in the extent to which these beliefs are held and that this 
warrants further investigation.  In terms of limitations, is important to note that some 
adult OCD literature has shown that depression and anxiety may be associated with 
TAF and perfectionism but this was not controlled for in this study.  
1.4.7 Summary of Evidence for Cognitive Models of OCD in Children.  
 There is some evidence that suggests that cognitive appraisals are linked to the 
development and maintenance of childhood OCD, however, conflicting evidence means 
that it is still unclear whether one specific cognitive model is most relevant. Further 
research is therefore needed to clarify the mediating roles of inflated responsibility, 
meta-cognitive beliefs and TAF. This study will focus on the inflated responsibility 
model.  
1.5 Developmental and Contextual Issues in OCD  
The next section will discuss the relevant contextual and developmental factors that may 
also play a role in the development and maintenance of OCD. 
1.5.1 Child Development  
 The onset of OCD commonly occurs between the ages of 10 and 12 years 
(Geller et al., 1998). It could be hypothesised that the development of OCD symptoms 
may reflect the change in the child’s ability to reflect on the impact of their thoughts and 
actions therefore making them more susceptible to an inflated sense of responsibility.  
 However, the question remains as to why certain children develop inflated 
responsibility beliefs and others do not. One possibility, proposed by Salkovskis et al. 
(1999), is that environmental factors such as social learning and early life experiences 
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play an important role. The impact of these psychosocial factors will be discussed in the 
next section.  
1.5.2 OCD and the Family   
 Waters and Barrett (2000) proposed that environmental factors, such as parental 
rearing style, threat interpretation and family accommodation of OCD symptoms may 
contribute to the development and maintenance of OCD.   
  1.5.2.1 Parental rearing style. A number of models of anxiety have proposed 
that parent-child relationships are important in the development of childhood anxiety 
disorders (Chorpita & Barlow, 1998; Rapee, 2001) and this relationship is characterised 
by an overprotective or over involved parenting style (Hudson & Rapee, 2001). 
According to Rapee (2001), the relationship between parent behaviour and child anxiety 
is somewhat responsible for the development and maintenance of childhood anxiety 
disorders. The model suggests that children who have a genetic vulnerability to anxiety 
are more likely to display high levels of arousal. In response to their child’s arousal, and 
in order to alleviate the child’s distress, a parent may increase their level of involvement 
and protection. This reinforces the child’s belief that their environment is dangerous and 
that they are not able to control it alone which in turn results in them trying to avoid the 
threat in the future.  
 This model has been supported by a number of retrospective studies that have 
found a link between over involved, controlling parenting styles and anxiety disorders 
(Rapee, 1997).  
 Turgeon et al. (2002) compared parental styles reported by adults with OCD 
(n=43), panic disorder with agoraphobia (n=38) and healthy controls (n=120). Results 
showed that individuals in both of the anxious groups reported their parents to be more 
overprotective than those in the control group. No differences were found between the 
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two anxious groups. Another study found that adults with OCD (n=40) reported higher 
levels of rejection from their father and lower levels of parental emotional warmth than 
a healthy control group (n=40; Alonso et al, 2004). 
 However, it is important to note that these studies were based on retrospective 
reports of parenting rearing styles, so a memory bias could be distorting the results.  
 An alternative view on parenting styles can be gained from observational 
studies. In terms of non-clinical samples, Krohne and Hock (1991) observed mother-
child interactions while the child (aged 10-13) completed a difficult cognitive task. The 
results showed that mothers of children that reported a high level of anxiety became 
more involved and more controlling than mothers of children with lower levels of 
anxiety.  
 In terms of a clinical sample, Barrett, Short and Healy (2002) compared the 
behaviours of parents and children in families where a child was diagnosed with OCD 
(n=18), or other anxiety disorders (n= 22), or externalising disorders (n=21), or no 
clinical problems (n=22). The family were asked to have a five minute discussion about 
a hypothetical situation involving physical threat, and a five minute discussion 
involving a social threat. The families were told that parents could help the child think 
about the problem but that the final decision was ultimately down to the child. Mothers 
and fathers of children with OCD were less promoting of independence, less likely to 
use positive problem solving and less confident in their child’s ability. Children in the 
OCD group displayed less warmth towards their parents, showed less positive problem 
solving and showed less confidence in their ability to solve the problem. Other 
observational studies have supported this finding showing that in difficult and stressful 
situations, mothers of anxious children were more intrusive and more involved than 
mothers of non-clinical children (Hudson & Rapee, 2001).  
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 1.5.2.2 Threat interpretation bias in parents and their children. It has been 
proposed that childhood anxiety disorders may in part be to do with parents transmitting 
their anxious cognitions to their children. A number of cognitive theories of anxiety 
propose that individuals with high trait anxiety are more likely to interpret ambiguous 
cues as threatening (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985, Creswell, Schniering & Rapee, 
2005). This leads the individual to avoid the situation in the future, which in turn 
reinforces anxious cognitions. It would therefore make sense that if parents do transmit 
biases to their children, then there would be an association between parent and child 
cognitive biases.  
 A number of studies have examined the relationship between threat 
interpretations of parents and their children. Creswell et al., (2005) investigated the 
nature of threat interpretations using 60 child participants, aged 7-15, and their mothers 
(27 children with anxiety disorders, 33 non-clinical children). Each child was presented 
with 12 ambiguous situations and given the option of two potential interpretations (one 
threatening and one non-threatening). The child was then asked to indicate which 
interpretation they would be more likely to make and explain what they would do next. 
Mothers were also asked to respond to 12 ambiguous scenarios.  Results showed that 
clinical children and their mothers were more likely to interpret ambiguous situations as 
threatening when compared to non-anxious children and that mother and their children’s 
threat interpretations were significantly correlated. Similarly, Barrett, Rapee, Dadds, 
and Ryan (1996) examined the response of anxious 7-14 year old children to a 
hypothetical situation of ambiguous threat before and after a discussion of the situation 
with their parents. Anxious children interpreted ambiguous situations as more 
threatening than non-anxious children and reported more avoidant coping responses 
after discussion of the situation with their parents than before. Findings from these 
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studies lends support to the idea that children’s information processing style may result 
from internalisation of parental perception of threat (Barlow, 1988). However, there are 
also other possible explanations for the findings, such as shared anxiety /genetic effects 
(Creswell et al., 2005).   
 Kortlander, Kendall and Panichelli-Mindel (1997) compared maternal 
expectations and attributions about their child’s ability to cope with a stressful situation 
in a group of anxious (n=40) and non-clinical (n= 40) children. Mothers of anxious 
children expected their child to be less able to perform the task, be more upset and be 
less able to make themselves feel comfortable. Also, maternal expectations for coping 
appeared to reflect the actual lower coping ability of the anxious child.  
  Lester, Field, Oliver and Cartwright-Hatton (2009) investigated whether a 
parent’s interpretative biases about potentially threatening situations in their own 
environment, determines whether they demonstrate similar biases towards potential 
threats in their child’s environment. Results showed that anxious parents interpreted 
ambiguous situations involving both themselves and their child as more threatening than 
parents with lower levels of anxiety. 
 1.5.2.3 Family accommodation. Family accommodation of OCD symptoms 
refers to actions taken by family members to assist or participate in the patient’s rituals 
(Albert, Bogetto, Maina, Brunatto & Mataix-Cols, 2010). Accommodation includes 
behaviours such as feeling obliged to assist the patient when they are carrying out a 
ritual, accepting the rigid rules that the patient imposes on themselves and the family, 
and giving reassurance (Calvocoressi et al., 1995). Up to 75% of parents who have a 
child with OCD engage in some form of accommodation (Storch et al., 2007). Although 
such behaviours are often done in an attempt to reduce ritual engagement and distress, it 
can often result in increased negative family dynamics (Storch et al., 2007) and an 
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increase in OCD related rituals. Family accommodation has also been linked to 
increased anxiety and depression in family members (Amir, Freshman, & Foa, 2000). A 
study by Storch et al.(2007) investigated the effect of family involvement in children 
aged 7-17 (n=57) with OCD using the Family Accommodation Scale (FAS; 
Calvocoressi et al., 1999). This is a 13-item clinician-rated measure that assesses the 
degree to which family members have accommodated the child’s OCD rituals over the 
last month and how much distress these accommodating behaviours have caused the 
child or family. Results showed that family accommodation was positively related to 
symptom severity and parent-rated child functional impairment. The most frequent type 
of family accommodation was found to be reassurance.  
 As family accommodation has been associated with poorer treatment outcomes 
in children and adolescents with OCD (Storch et al., 2007) it is possible that 
interventions aimed at reducing family accommodation may result in a significant 
reduction in OCD symptoms (Albert et al., 2010). Such interventions have been 
proposed as part of a broader cognitive behavioural treatment (Freeman et al., 2003) and 
the NICE guidelines (2006) now recommend that carers or family members play an 
active role in the planning and treatment of children and adolescents with OCD.  Studies 
have already shown that interventions which include extensive family participation 
result in a greater reduction in OCD symptoms when compared to studies in which 
families are not involved (Barrett, Healy-Farrell & March, 2004).  
 As reassurance was found to be the most frequent type of family 
accommodation, this will be investigated further in the next section.   
 1.5.2.4 Reassurance seeking behaviour and OCD. Compulsive reassurance-
seeking is a common behaviour observed in children with OCD (Clark, 2004). Within 
the context of OCD, reassurance seeking can be defined as repeatedly asking others for 
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safety-related information about situations or objects even after the information has 
already been given. Research has shown that reassurance seeking is one of the most 
common strategies used by OCD sufferer’s to try to reduce their obsessional thoughts 
and images (Freeston et al., 1997).  
 According to Rachman (2002), reassurance seeking is a variant of compulsive 
checking, both of which aim to reduce anxiety by minimising the likelihood and 
perceived responsibility of negative outcomes. As with other safety behaviours, 
reassurance seeking reinforces the child’s belief that they are unable to cope with the 
anxiety and discomfort alone and also prevents them for disconfirming their 
catastrophic belief. The receiving of reassurance is also accompanied with a temporary 
reduction of anxiety and perceived responsibility, increasing the likelihood that the 
child will engage in reassurance seeking behaviour again in the future.   
 In order to test Rachman’s theory (2002), a number of recent studies have 
investigated whether checking and reassurance seeking serve similar functions in the 
maintenance of OCD. Using a classification task, Parrish and Radomsky (2006) 
manipulated responsibility and reassurance by assigning a group of non-clinical 
participants (n=124) to either a high or low responsibility conditions. In line with 
Rachman’s theory (2002) individuals in the high responsibility group reported greater 
urges to check and seek reassurance compared to the low responsibility group. The 
authors conclude that checking and reassurance seeking may be functionally equivalent 
and/or driven by similar processes. However, the use of a non-clinical sample limits the 
potential generalisability of the results and the study did not directly focus on the 
function of these behaviours.  
 To overcome these limitations, Parrish and Radomsky (2010) developed a semi-
structured interview to compare the content and cognitive processes involved in 
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excessive reassurance seeking in a people with OCD (n=15), depression (n=15) and 
healthy controls (n=20). Reassurance seeking in individuals with OCD focused mainly 
on perceived general threats (e.g. fire, theft) whereas individuals with depression 
focused mainly on social threats (e.g. abandonment).  
 Given the potential impact of reassurance seeking and other safety behaviours 
on the maintenance of OCD it seems remarkable that so few papers have been published 
in the area. The role of compulsive reassurance-seeking in the maintenance of OCD 
therefore warrants further investigation.  
1.6 Chapter Summary 
 In order to provide a context for the current study, this chapter has reviewed the 
current literature in OCD. The literature suggests that the presentation of OCD may be 
similar in children and adults. Strengths and limitations of current treatment approaches 
for childhood OCD have also been discussed. Three cognitive models of OCD have 
been described along with a critical review of evidence for each model in relation to 
adults and children. Cognitive models of OCD can be applied to children and 
responsibility attitudes may play a key role. Developmental and family factors have 
been considered with a specific focus on parenting rearing styles, threat interpretation 
and family accommodation.  
   1.7 Review of Pertinent Studies Leading to Hypotheses 
 The aim of the following section is to bring together the central arguments that 
lead to the three main hypotheses in this study. It will do this by first clarifying the 
responsibility model and then reviewing the experimental studies that lead to 
hypotheses 1 and 2. This section will then go on to construct a clear rational for 
hypothesis 3.  
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1.7.1 Overview of Responsibility Model 
 The inflated responsibility model is based on the idea that inflated responsibility 
is a central cognitive variable in the development and maintenance of OCD (Rachman, 
1993).  
 Responsibility is defined as the belief of possessing a pivotal power to bring 
about or prevent potential negative outcomes (Salkovskis et al., 1992 cited in 
Salkovskis, 1995).  
 This definition of responsibility focuses on two related cognitive distortions: 
personal influence and potential negative outcome. Personal influence relates to the 
belief that you are personally responsible for causing/preventing harm to yourself or 
others, whereas potential negative outcome relates to the interpretation of risk 
(including perceived severity of harm and probability of harm). Perceived severity of 
harm refers to beliefs about the personal costs of the potential aversive event whereas 
probability of harm refers to the belief about the likelihood of that aversive event 
occurring (Farrell and Barrett, 2006). It has been suggested that individuals with OCD 
often overestimate of probability and severity of harm associated with an intrusive 
thought.  
 Salkovskis proposes that an obsessional pattern occurs if negative intrusive 
thoughts are interpreted as meaning that the person is responsible for subsequent harm 
to self and others, unless they take action to avoid that harm. This leads to increased 
discomfort and anxiety which in turn leads the individual to engage in neutralising 
behaviours including overt and covert compulsions. By carrying out the compulsion, the 
individual believes that they can reduce the possibility of harm coming to themselves 
and others which in turn reduces their anxiety.  
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1.7.2. Review of pertinent experimental studies from adult and child literature 
 There have been a number of studies that have explored the link between 
responsibility and compulsive behaviour in more detail. Using a behavioural approach 
test (BAT) Lopatka and Rachman (1995) conducted an experimental manipulation of 
responsibility by exposing OC sufferers to different levels of responsibility. In the 
experimental condition, individuals agreed to let the therapist resume all responsibility 
for any potential negative consequences for a fixed period of time. In the control 
condition, the individuals assumed all responsibility themselves. Results showed that a 
reduction in perceived responsibility (experimental condition) was followed by a 
significant decline in perceived discomfort, urge to check, probability of anticipated 
harm, severity of anticipated harm and estimated length of time needed to finish 
checking. Increases in perceived responsibility resulted in increased perceived 
discomfort and urge to check but did not increase estimated probability of harm or 
estimated severity of harm. The authors suggested that the deliberate inflation of 
responsibility resulted in non-significant effects as the subject’s level of responsibility 
was already so high that there was little room for further inflation by the experimental 
test. They suggested that a replication was needed in which a lower starting level of 
responsibility is employed. Despite the strengths of this study, no behavioural variables 
were used e.g. number of checks or the actual time spent checking.  
 These shortcomings were address by Ladouceur et al. (1995) by randomly 
assigning a group of non-clinical adults to high (HR) and low perceived responsibility 
(LR) condition. Based on Salkovskis’  definition of responsibility, Ladouceur et al. 
proposed that increasing perceived severity, probability and influence should increase 
the subjective perception of responsibility. In the first study, a sound recognition task 
was used to compare checking behaviour in the HR and LR conditions. Subjects from 
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the HR group reported more severity, probability, influence and responsibility related to 
consequences, but this did not have any effect on behavioural variable of checking, 
errors and time. The authors noted that one possible explanation for the absence of 
differences on checking behaviours was the weak effects of manipulation on perceived 
responsibility and the task difficulty.  
 A second study was therefore conducted with the aim of creating a more 
powerful manipulation of responsibility. Subjects in the HR group were asked to sort 
two hundred pharmaceutical capsules by colour and told that their work would directly 
influence treatment safety for a widespread virus in a South East Asian country. 
Individuals in the LR group were asked to complete the same task but were told that the 
study was interested in perception of colour alone. A manipulation check showed that 
the manipulation had been successful. Participants in the HR group reported 
significantly more severity, probability, perceived influence and responsibility for 
consequences than those in the LR group. They also reported higher levels of anxiety 
and were more worried about the possibility of making a mistake. Results showed that 
participants from the HR group showed significantly more hesitations and checking 
behaviours than subjects from the LR group. Authors suggest that elevated perceived 
responsibility results in increased checking behaviours, which supports Salkovskis’ 
model of inflated responsibility. Further analyses of the results showed that a single 
variable, severity of outcome, accounted for the difference between groups. Authors 
suggest that perceived severity may be a more important variable than previously 
thought. However, all the other manipulation variables were also significantly different 
between groups suggesting that they too may also be necessary to produce compulsive-
like behaviour.  
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 Ladouceur, Rheaume and Aublet then went on to complete a similar study in 
1997. The aim of this study was to clarify the respective roles of personal influence and 
negative consequence and their potential interaction in the construct of perceived 
responsibility. Instructions were the same as those used in part two of his previous study 
(Ladouceur et al., 1995), however this time 77 non-clinical adults were randomly 
assigned to one of four groups. The first was a combined condition during which 
participants were told that they were working alone and therefore their role was crucial 
for the success of the project (influence + negative consequence). The second was the 
influence condition during which they were told that their role was important but that 
they were part of a small group of three people and therefore not solely responsible 
(influence alone). The third group was the negative consequences condition during 
which participants were given the same instructions as the combined condition but told 
that 2000 participants would be providing data (negative consequence alone). The 
fourth group was the control group during which participants were told that their phase 
was just a practice and had no importance (no influence and no negative consequence). 
The results confirmed that the manipulation had been successful and the four 
experimental groups differed significantly on perceived influence, probability and 
severity of harm. Results showed that subjects in the combined condition perceived 
significantly more responsibility that those in the other three groups. This indicates that 
when influence and negative consequence were increased simultaneously, the subjects 
perceived themselves to be more responsible than when only one component was 
manipulated. Results also showed that at a subjective level, perceived influence was a 
better predictor of perceived responsibility than was the overestimation of negative 
consequences. On a behavioural level, results showed that subjects in all three of the 
experimental conditions showed significantly more hesitations than those in the control 
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group and those in the combined and negative consequences group reported more 
checking than those in the control group.  
 Based on Ladouceur et al’s studies, Arntz, Voncken and Goosen (2007) tested 
the causal status of responsibility in OCD by experimentally manipulating responsibility 
in a clinical sample. They hypothesised that if elevated responsibility is indeed a causal 
factor in OCD, then people with OCD, when placed in a situation in which they have a 
personal responsibility for averting threat, will engage in more risk reducing behaviours 
than other people. In an attempt to completely eliminate the risk, these behaviours may 
be repeated and compulsive rituals may develop. OCD patients, non-OCD anxiety 
controls and non-patients were assigned to either a HR or LR condition and asked to 
complete a classification task. The classification task, similar to that used by Ladouceur 
et al. , was entirely new for every participant and therefore any OCD-like behaviour 
triggered during the experiment was new and not merely repetitions of earlier OCD 
symptoms related to similar situations. Results showed that only the HR OCD group 
and not the LR OCD group engaged in higher levels of OCD-like checking behaviour. 
Also, the influence of high responsibility is specific to OCD as the HR anxious control 
group did not respond similarly to the HR OCD group. Unlike the findings of 
Ladouceur et al., Arntz et al. (2007), did not find that the responsibility induction lead to 
OCD-type behaviours in non-patients. The authors noted that this may be because they 
had slightly changed Ladouceur’s responsibility induction to make it stronger. High 
levels of responsibility for negative consequences probably elicit OCD behaviours in 
everybody, whereas low levels of responsibility only trigger such behaviours in 
vulnerable people (Bouchard, Rheaume, & Ladouceur et al. , 1999).   
 Research into the role of cognitive factors in OCD amongst children is sparse. A 
recent systematic review examining whether cognitive models of OCD applied to 
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children concluded that overall, the evidence suggests that cognitive models of OCD do 
apply to children (Reynolds & Reeves, 2008). However, the existing literature is largely 
based on observational studies meaning that the causal relationships between cognitive 
processes and OCD symptoms can not be assumed. Only two studies have used 
experimental designs to investigate cognitive models of OCD in a non-clinical sample 
of children (Reeves et al., 2010; Reynolds et al., submitted).  
 Reeves et al. (2010) adapted Ladouceur et al’s (1997) sorting task to make it 
appropriate for non-clinical sample of 9-12 year olds (n=81). Children were randomly 
allocated to one of three conditions: an inflated responsibility group, a moderate 
responsibility group and a reduced responsibility group. In all three groups children 
were asked to sort sweets according to whether they had nuts in or not. Responsibility 
was induced by telling the children that the sweets would be given to a group of 
children, where one child had a nut allergy. Children in the high responsibility group 
were told that the experimenter would not check the sweets after they had been sorted 
and therefore it was important that the children sorted them as carefully as possible. 
Children in the moderate responsibility group were not given any information about 
whether the sorted sweets would be checked or not. Children in the reduced 
responsibility group were told that their work would be checked by the researcher and 
therefore mistakes would not be their fault. The effect of the manipulation was 
examined on several dependent variables: number of checks, number of hesitations, 
time taken to complete the task and level of anxiety. Results showed that as perceived 
responsibility increased, children checked and hesitated more often and took longer to 
complete the task. Groups did not differ in self-reported state anxiety.  
 This study has a number of strengths. For example, the use of an experimental 
design meant that the possible causal role of OCD could be inferred. The authors also 
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adapted a previously used experimental task resulting in it being appropriate for use 
with children of this age. The experimental task also had good face validity. A 
limitation of the study was the lack of a control group.  
 Reynolds et al., (submitted) attempted to address these shortcomings by 
replicating and extending the study by Reeves et al. (2010). The extension included the 
addition of a control group in which children were not given any responsibility as well 
as an inflated responsibility group and a reduced responsibility group. In line with the 
inflated responsibility model of OCD (Salkovskis et al., 2000), reassurance seeking was 
also added as another type of OCD-like behaviour. Sixty-nine children aged 9-11 
participated in the study. Inflated responsibility increased reassurance seeking and also 
increased the time taken to complete the task. Unexpectedly, state anxiety, number of 
checks or hesitations did not increase with increased responsibility. Results also showed 
that although the sorting task was successful in manipulating responsibility between the 
high and reduced responsibility groups, the control group did not differ significantly 
from either of the experimental groups in post-task perceived levels of responsibility  
 This study has a number of strengths such as the inclusion of reassurance 
seeking and the use of reliable and valid questionnaires to measure possible 
confounding variables. The use of non-clinical samples allows investigations into the 
causes of OCD.  
1.7.3. Research Aims and Rational for Hypothesis 1 &2  
 This study aims to further investigate whether the inflated responsibility model 
of OCD applies to children by replicating and extending these experimental studies 
using a sample of non-clinical children aged 9-11. The association between reassurance 
seeking, checking, inflated responsibility and children’s anxiety will be explored using 
an experimental task based on previous research (Reeves et al., 2010; Reynolds et al., 
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submitted). This study will include a control group where children are explicitly told 
that they are not responsible for the outcome of the task. The purpose of this adaptation 
is to establish clear differences between the High Responsibility group (HR) and the 
control group.  
 The model of OCD suggests that intrusive thoughts are accompanied by an 
increase in state anxiety and that individuals then carry out their compulsions in an 
attempt to relieve this anxiety. It would therefore be logical to predict that participants 
in the high responsibility group will report higher levels of state anxiety after the sorting 
task than the control group. A number of adult studies using a similar experimental 
design have shown that subjects in the high responsibility group reported higher levels 
of anxiety following the manipulation than those in the low responsibility group 
(Ladouceur et al., 1995; Lopatka and Rachman, 1995). Interestingly both experimental 
studies to date (Reynolds et al., submitted; Reeves et al., 2010) have found that the 
groups did not differ in anxiety after the sorting task (see Discussion). Despite the 
existing child literature showing null effects in this regard, analyses of post task state 
anxiety will be included in the current study. It is hoped that this analyses will help 
consolidate the findings of the two key child studies mentioned (Reynolds et al., 
submitted and Reeves et al., 2010). 
 Based on the findings of the previous experimental studies, it is hypothesised 
that children in the high responsibility group will be report a higher perceptions of 
responsibility (influence, probably and severity of harm) than those in the control group, 
and this will lead them to display a higher number of OCD type behaviours. 1.7.4. 
Research Aims and Rationale for Hypothesis 3  
 Salkovskis, Shafran, Rachman & Freeston (1999) have identified a number of 
pathways through which inflated responsibility may develop, including early 
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experiences of having excessive amounts of responsibility, or in contrast, through being 
sheltered from age appropriate responsibility of self. As OCD often develops in 
childhood and adolescents Salkovskis et al, (1999) hypothesised that the family 
environment was a critical context in which attitudes and beliefs about responsibility 
would be developed. A number of models of anxiety have also proposed that parent-
child relationships are important in the development of childhood anxiety disorders 
(Chorpita & Barlow, 1998; Rapee, 2001) and this relationship is characterised by an 
overprotective or overinvolved parenting style (Hudson & Rapee, 2001). This high level 
of parental control have been hypothesised to contribute to the development or 
exacerbation of children’s anxiety symptoms through a variety of ways including 
signalling that the environment is threatening and thus raising children’s vigilance for 
threat, signalling that the parent does not believe the child is able to deal with the 
perceived threat and failing to model appropriate ways to deal with threatening 
situations. (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985, Creswell, Schniering & Rapee, 2005).  It 
has also been suggested that children who have a genetic vulnerability to anxiety are 
more likely to display high levels of arousal (Rappee, 2001). In response to their child’s 
arousal, and in order to alleviate the child’s distress, a parent may increase their level of 
involvement and protection. This reinforces the child’s belief that their environment is 
dangerous and that they are not able to control it alone which in turn results in them 
trying to avoid the threat in the future.  
 Similarly, family accommodation of OCD symptoms is found to be prevalent in 
up to 75% of parents who have a child with OCD and is aimed at reducing  ritual 
engagement and distress (Albert, Bogetto, Maina, Brunatto & Mataix-Cols, 2010). The 
most frequent type of family accommodation is found to be reassurance giving (Storch 
et al., 2007).  This acts as a form of negative reinforcement, which strengthens the 
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child’s belief that they are unable to cope alone and promotes OCD type beliefs and 
behaviours in the child. 
 Based on the fact that compulsive reassurance-seeking is the most common 
behaviour observed in children with OCD (Clark, 2004), and reassurance giving is the 
most common form of accommodation (Storch et al., 2007) this study aims to 
investigate the relationship between child’s reassurance seeking and mother’s 
reassurance giving during the task. 
  It was therefore hypothesised that mothers with children in the HR condition, 
would respond to their child’s increased level of arousal by giving more reassurance 
than those with children in the control group and that this would increase reassurance 
seeking behaviour in their child.  
1.8 Setting Conditions and Research Hypotheses 
1.8.1 Setting Conditions  
 The following study will have two critical setting conditions. The first setting 
condition focuses on the successfulness of the manipulation. If the manipulation is 
successful, it is predicted that participants in the high responsibility group will report 
higher levels of inflated responsibility compared to the control group. The second 
setting condition is based on reported state anxiety. Previous experimental studies in 
both child and adult literature have shown differing results. This study therefore sets out 
to investigate whether or not participants in the high responsibility group report higher 
levels of anxiety after the sorting task than the control group.  
On the basis that these setting conditions are demonstrated, my more specific 
hypotheses are:   
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1.8.2 Hypothesis 1 
 Participants in the high responsibility group will take longer to complete the 
sorting task and check, hesitate and seek more reassurance than the control group.  
1.8.3 Hypothesis 2 
 Participants in the high responsibility group will report higher perceptions of 
influence and higher perceptions of probability and severity of harm after the sorting 
task than the control group.  
1.8.4 Hypothesis 3  
 Mothers with children in the high responsibility group will provide more 
reassurance than those with children in the control group.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Methodology 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
 The aim of this chapter is to give a detailed account of the method used in this 
study. Firstly, the design of the study will be described.  This will be followed by 
information about the participants and a detailed description of the measures used and 
their psychometric properties. The experimental task will be explained, followed by a 
discussion about ethical issues and an outline of the procedure.   
     2.2 Design 
 This study adopted a between-subjects experimental design. Using a block 
randomisation method, children and their mothers were allocated to one of two 
experimental conditions: increased responsibility and control. Thus, the independent 
variable was perceived level of responsibility. The use of the block randomisation 
method enabled an equal number of participants to be assigned to each group and also 
accounted for the varying rates in which participant were recruited (Solso & Johnson, 
1994). In each of the experimental groups participants were asked to complete a sorting 
task. Dependent variables were: time taken to complete the task, number of checks, 
hesitations and reassurance seeking behaviours, perception of responsibility for harm, 
probability of harm, and severity of harm and level of state anxiety. The design was 
adapted from an experimental sorting task reported in adult literature (Ladouceur at al., 
1995) and adapted for children (Reeves et al., 2010).  
     2.3 Participants  
 Participants were 52 children aged 9 to 11 and their mothers.  The selection of 
this age group was based on the findings that children of this age group have developed 
responsibility beliefs (Barrett and Healy, 2003; Magnusdottir and Smari, 2004). This 
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age group may also be vulnerable to the development of OCD because the average age 
of onset ranges from 7.5 – 11.6 ( Hollingsworth et al., 1980, Pauls et al., 1995). Mothers 
only were recruited because of evidence that mothers and fathers may play a very 
different role in the development and maintenance of childhood anxiety disorders (van 
der Bruggen, Stams, & Bogels, 2008). 
2.3.1. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria  
 Children were eligible to participate in the study if they were aged 9-11 years 
old, were fluent in English and lived with their mother. Children were excluded from 
the study if they had intellectual disabilities, as this could have affected their 
performance on the tasks and their ability to complete questionnaires. Children who 
were colour blind were also excluded from the study, as the sorting task required colour 
vision.  Children with nut allergies were also excluded. All of the above criteria were 
assessed by the children’s teachers and/or mothers.   
2.3.2 Sample Size 
  The sample size was calculated using G* Power 3.0.3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007). Using a 0.45 effect size from previous research (Reynolds et al., 
submitted ), setting power at 80% and using a significance level of 5%, 26 participants 
were required in each group (52 in total).   
2.3.3 Recruitment 
 Participants were recruited from primary schools in Cambridgeshire, Suffolk, 
Sussex and Norfolk. Initially six schools were contacted via email. This contact was 
made through the Head Teachers who were given information about the study via email 
(see appendix A). If the head teacher indicated provisional willingness to take part a 
meeting was arranged to provide further information about the study and to gain their 
permission to recruit children at their school. A total of fifteen primary schools were 
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contacted and six agreed to take part. Details of the schools that took part are included 
in the appendix (see appendix B); in the text they are referred to ask schools A-F. 
 Information packs were then sent out to the children’s homes from the 
participating schools. The information pack included a covering letter from the school, 
an invitation letter to mothers (see appendix C), an information sheet (appendix D), a 
mothers’ consent form (appendix E), and a demographic questionnaire (appendix F). To 
encourage participation a £3 book voucher was given to the school for each child that 
took part. Mothers who wanted to take part were asked to return the consent form to the 
school. They were then telephoned by the researcher to conduct a brief screening 
interview. This allowed the researcher to check that the child met the inclusion criteria 
and to arrange for a home visit if appropriate. Parents were also encouraged to ask any 
questions they may have regarding the study.   
 Forty information packs were sent out to primary school A of which 6 were 
returned giving a 15% response rate.  10 packs were sent out to primary school B of 
which 2 were returned giving a 20% response rate. 30 packs were sent out to primary 
school C of which 12 were returned giving a 40% response rate. 27 packs were sent out 
to primary school D of which 1 was returned giving a 3.7 % response rate. 60 packs 
were sent out to primary school E of which 15 were returned giving a 25 % response 
rate. 60 packs were sent out to primary school F of which 19 were returned giving a 
31.6 % response rate. The overall number of information packs sent out was 227 giving 
a combined response rate of 24.2%.  1 child was excluded for having an intellectual 
disability, 1 for having a nut allergy and 1 for being colour blind.  
2.4. Experimental Task 
Children and their mothers were randomly assigned to one of two experimental 
groups: an inflated responsibility group and a control group. In order to ensure that all 
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the children received the same instructions, task instructions for both groups were 
recorded in advance and played to the children using a Dictaphone. 
 Children in both groups were given a bag of 120 sweets, made up of six 
different colours (blue, green, gold, silver, red and pink; 20 of each colour). Children in 
the high responsibility group were told that the blue and green sweets contained nuts, 
that the gold and silver sweets might contain nuts, and that the red and pink sweets did 
not contain nuts. They were told that the sweets had been mixed up and that their task 
was to sort them into three bowls, one for sweets containing nuts, one for sweets that 
might contain nuts, and one for sweets that did not contain nuts. Responsibility was 
induced by telling children that the sweets would be given to a group of children, one of 
whom had a nut allergy. They were told that sweets would not be checked before they 
were given to the children and that it was therefore important that they sorted the sweets 
as carefully as possible.  
 In order to make the memory load between the two groups similar, children in  
the control group were not given information regarding nut allergies, harm or 
responsibility but were instead asked to sort sweets according to flavour. They were told 
that the blue and green sweets were chocolate flavour, the gold and silver were mint 
flavour and the red and pink sweets were fruit flavour. Their task was to sort the sweets 
into three bowls, one for mint flavoured sweets, one for fruit flavoured sweets, and one 
for chocolate flavoured sweets.  
 In both groups the children were told to take one sweet at a time and to sort this 
before moving on to the next. They were instructed to not look into the bag. This would 
ensure that they did not know what colour the sweet was until they had looked at it. 
They were also asked to complete the task as quickly as possible but told that if they 
were not sure that they could check the sweets and bowls as many times as they liked. 
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In both groups prompt sheets were provided, reminding the children of their flavours or 
presence of nuts (Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Photo of the experimental task 
 
  
Before the experimental task, mothers in both groups were fully briefed about the true 
nature of the task.  They were instructed not to become too involved in the task but to 
respond in the way that they normally would to their child. In order to measure the 
behavioural variables and to allow for inter-rater reliability, the children and their 
mothers were video-recorded while completing the task.   
2.5 Ethical Considerations 
 Ethical approval for this study was obtained from The Institute of Health Ethics 
Committee, at the University of East Anglia (UEA; see appendix G for letters of 
approval).  As children are considered vulnerable research participants, guidance from 
British Psychological Society Publications (BPS, 2006) was followed and potential risks 
and benefits were considered.  
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2.5.1 Consent 
 Included in the information packs, mothers were asked to complete a consent 
form giving permission for their child and themselves to participate in the study. Parents 
were also supplied with the researcher’s contact details, and were encouraged to get in 
touch if they had any queries regarding the study. Children could only participate with 
consent from their mothers.  
 The children were also provided with age-appropriate information sheets (see 
Appendix H) and were asked for written assent prior to completing the task (see 
Appendix I). Both mother and child were informed that participation in the study was 
voluntary and that they could withdraw at any time without giving reason.  
2.5.2 Deception 
 Prior to participation, mothers were briefed about the true nature of their child’s 
task. In order for the experimental manipulation to be successful, children in the 
different groups were given different information about the level of responsibility over 
the consequences of the sorting task. However, children in both the high responsibility 
group and the control group were fully debriefed after they had completed the task. Full 
information about the consequence of the sorting task was provided. The BPS (2006) 
ethical guidelines state that in order to study some psychological processes, it is 
necessary to withhold some details of the hypothesis under test. It states that the central 
principle is the reaction of the participant when it is revealed. Time was spent with the 
child, discussing the child’s experience of the research, and monitoring any unforeseen 
negative effects.  
2.5.3 Managing Distress 
 In accordance with BPS (BPS, 2006) and Department of Children, School and 
Families (DCSF, 2004) guidelines, safeguarding children procedures were followed at 
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all times. Researchers endeavoured to minimise any risk of distress while administering 
the task. The task would have been discontinued immediately if a child had shown any 
signs of distress. Time would then be taken to talk with the child and alleviate any 
anxieties or worries that they were having.  
 If scores on the questionnaires indicated that a child or their mother was 
experiencing psychological difficulties (i.e. if their scores were above the clinical cut 
off), mothers were sent a letter informing them of the results. The letter also suggesting 
that their GP would be an appropriate source of information if they wanted further 
advice. 
2.5.4 Confidentiality and Anonymity  
 In line with the Data Protection Act (1998), and in accordance with UEA’s 
guidelines on Good Practice, raw data, including written records and videotapes, were 
coded anonymously and stored in a locked cabinet. This was available only to the 
researchers and kept for five years. Participants were informed as to how the data were 
handled prior to the study. Parents, children and the school were informed that their 
identity would not be revealed in the research data or reports.  
2.6 Measures 
2.6.1 Demographic questionnaire.  
 A demographic questionnaire was used to collect data on the child’s age, gender, 
ethnic origin, colour blindness, and family history of allergies (Reeves et al, 2009). 
Mothers were asked to complete the questionnaire when they consented to their child’s 
participation. If it had been suspected that a child was colour blind during data 
collection, the study would have continued but the results would have been excluded 
from the analysis. If this had happened, the researcher would have advised the mother to 
contact their family GP for further testing, advise, guidance and support. If a mother or 
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child had become distressed at this discovery, empathy and support would have been 
provided by the researcher or mother and their child would also have been reminded of 
their rights to withdraw from the study. However no children were discovered to be 
colour blind during data collection.  
2.6.2 Confounding variable Measures 
 2.6.2.1 The Spence Children’s Anxiety Scale (SCAS; Spence, 1998). The SCAS 
is a 45-item self-report measure used to assess symptoms of anxiety in children aged 8 
to 12 years old (Appendix J). It is made up of six subscales, social anxiety, 
panic/agoraphobia, obsessions/compulsions, separation anxiety and fear of physical 
injury. Children are asked to rate how often the symptoms occur on a 4-point scale 
ranging from 0 (never) to 3 (always). Children who are clinically anxious record a mean 
of 42.28 (Spence, 1998). The SCAS has high internal reliability, with coefficient alpha 
of .92 and a Guttman split-half reliability of .90 (Spence, 1998). The test-retest 
reliability in 120 children after six months was 0.51 (Spence, 1998).  The SCAS was 
used to control for anxiety 
 2.6.2.2 Child Responsibility Attitude Scale (CRAS; Salkovskis & Williams, 
2004).  The Responsibility Attitude Scale is a 26-item questionnaire which measures 
assumptions or general beliefs related to inflated responsibility (RAS; Salkovskis et al., 
2000). The adapted version is known as the Child Responsibility Attitude Scale (CRAS) 
and has fewer questions (20-items) and age appropriate language (See Appendix K). 
Scores range from 20-140 with lower scores indicating higher levels of inflated 
responsibility. The CRAS was used in this study to measure and control for inflated 
responsibility beliefs across the experimental groups.  
 2.6.2.3 Children’s Depression Inventory – Short Form (CDI-S; Kovacs, 
1985).The CDI-S is a 10-item self-report measure for use with children and young 
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people aged 7-17. The CDI-S was used to control for symptoms of depression. Children 
rate how they have been feeling over the past two weeks on a 3 point scale 0, 1 or 2.  
Raw scores are converted to standardised T scores (Kovacs, 1985). The measure has 
good internal consistency, with alpha reliability coefficient of .80 (Kovacs, 1985) and 
has acceptable test-retest reliability coefficients ranging between .74 and .77 in a non-
clinical sample (Smucker, Craighead, Craighead, & Green, 1986). A copy of this 
measure has not been added to the appendices as permission was not granted by the 
author.  
 2.6.2.4 Beck Anxiety Inventory. The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & 
Steer, 1990) is a 21-item self-report measure designed to assess the severity of primarily 
somatic anxiety symptoms experienced by respondents during the previous two weeks. 
The BAI has an average reliability coefficient of .92 and a test-retest reliability of .75 
(De Ayala, Vonderharr-Carlson & Doyoung, 2005). Mothers were asked to complete 
the BAI while their children completed their measures. This was used to measure and 
control for mothers’ level of anxiety. 
2.6.3 Measures of Anxiety and Inflated Responsibility.  
 2.6.3.1 The State Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children (STAIC; Spielberger, 
Edwards, Lushene, Montouri & Platzek, 1973). The STAIC is a is a 20 item self-report 
questionnaire designed to measure state and trait anxiety in children aged between 9 and 
12 years (Appendix L). In this study only the state part of the inventory was used. This 
is designed to measure subjective transitory anxiety states, such as feelings of 
apprehension, tension, and worry that vary in intensity and fluctuate over time 
(Spielberger et al., 1973). Items are rated on a 3-point Likert Scale, 0 (never true/not at 
all) to 2 (completely true/often) with a maximum score of 40. It demonstrates good 
retest reliability (r = .63 to .72; Finch, Kendall, Montgomery & Morris, 1975). The state 
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anxiety scale demonstrates good internal consistency, with alpha reliability coefficient 
of .82 for males and .87 for females (Spielberger et al., 1973). To measure changes in 
the child’s state anxiety, the STAI-C was administered at twice, once before the sorting 
task and once after the sorting task.  
 2.6.3.2 Measure of perceived inflated responsibility. As mentioned in the 
introduction, Salkovskis’ definition of responsibility focuses on two related cognitive 
distortions: personal influence and potential negative outcome. Personal influence 
relates to the belief that you are personally responsible for causing/preventing harm to 
yourself or others, whereas potential negative outcome relates to the interpretation of 
risk (including perceived severity of harm and probability of harm). In order to 
operationalise these parts of the responsibility model, Reeves et al. (2010), created a 
series of six statements, made up for three subscales. Out of the six statements, two of 
the statements were designed to assess perceptions of influence, two to assess 
perceptions of probability of harm and two to assess perceptions of severity of harm. 
Using a 5-point Likert scale, children were asked to rate how much they believed in 
each statement based on a scale of 0- 4, with 0 representing completely disagree and 4 
representing completely agree. The idea behind the 6 statements was to allow the 
researcher to obtain a measure of overall perceived responsibility and also obtain a 
measure of the various components that make up this construct. This also allows the 
researcher to ascertain which components of inflated responsibility are associated with 
OCD behaviours.  
 In order to ensure that the manipulation of the responsibility had been effective, 
and to determine whether the two groups had different levels of perceptions of 
responsibility, probability of harm and severity of harm after the task, the questions 
were asked before and after the sorting task (Appendix M). Due to the fact that this 
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measure only contained six statements (2 in each subscale); it was not considered as a 
questionnaire in an additive sense. Therefore internal consistency of the measure was 
not calculated.  
2.6.4 Behavioural Measures 
 The behavioural measures are based on those used in Reeves et al. (2010)
 2.6.4.1 Time taken to complete the task.  
 This was measured in seconds using a stop watch. Timing began as soon as the 
child was told to start the sorting task and finished as soon at the child informed the 
researcher or mum that they had finished.  
 2.6.4.2 Number of checks.  
 The number of checks that a child made during the sorting task was recorded. A 
check was defined as (Reeves et al., 2010):  
• Emptying the content of a bowl onto the table or into the participants hand or; 
• Looking at the colour key to see whether a sweet contains nuts or; 
• Stopping the task and gazing at a particular bowl for at least 1 second or;  
• Sorting through the bowls.  
• Feeling the sweet for at least 1 second or longer or;  
• Checking the bowl’s label. 
 2.6.4.3 Number of hesitations.  
 The number of hesitations that a child made during the sorting task was counted. 
A hesitation was defined as (Reeves et al., 2010):  
• A movement of a child’s hand between two different bowl for at least 1 second 
or; 
• A close examination of a sweet for at least 1 second.  
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 2.6.4.4 Reassurance seeking behaviour. Based on Reynolds et al. (submitted). 
The number of reassurance seeking behaviours that a child made during the sorting task 
was counted. A reassurance seeking behaviour was defined as:  
• Asking Mum if what they are doing is right or; 
• Asking Mum to check it for them or;  
• Asking Mum to do it with them or;  
• Asking Mum what would happen if they did it wrong; 
• Glancing at mother; 
• Looking at mother for an extended period of time.  
 2.6.4.5 Mothers reassurance giving. Based on Reynolds et al. (submitted). The 
number of reassurance giving behaviours that mother made during the sorting task was 
counted. A reassurance giving behaviour was defined as: 
• Glancing over at the child: A purposeful glance toward the child involving a 
change of direction of the mother’s eyes observed on the video tape. 
• Helping the child with the task: A physical attempt to help the child in the task, 
for example helping to straighten the bowls, examining/ altering the contents of 
the bowls.  
• Offering unprompted reassurance: A positive verbal comment made by the 
mother in relating to either the child’s current state or the task performance e.g. 
‘That’s fine’, ‘You’re doing great’, ‘Well done’, ‘That’s right’.  
2.7 Procedure 
 The study was conducted at the child’s home. On arrival at the child’s home, 
each child was given an information sheet. They were reminded that participation was 
voluntary and they could withdraw at any time without giving a reason. Children who 
wanted to participate were asked to complete a written assent form. Mother – child 
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dyads were then assigned to an experimental group (high responsibility or control) 
using a block randomisation method with 6 blocks. The random assignment of the 
experimental conditions was calculated by a colleague at UEA who was independent to 
the study. Using envelopes labels 1-52, each envelope corresponded with a participant 
number. After the child had completed the written assent form, the researcher opened up 
the corresponding envelope to determine which experimental group the child was 
assigned to.  
  Before the sorting task, each child was asked to complete the CDI-S, the CRAS, 
the SCAS, the state form of the STAIC, and the measure of perception of responsibility, 
probability of harm and severity of harm. Mothers were also asked to complete the BAI. 
During the task mothers were instructed not to help their child complete the task but to 
respond as they naturally would if the child asks for assistance. 
 Using a digital voice recorder, all children were then played the information 
about the sorting task (see Appendix N for task instructions). This ensured that that each 
child received exactly the same instructions in exactly the same tone of voice. After 
they complete the task children completed the post task measures.  They were then 
debriefed. Feedback from the participants was encouraged and any worries were 
discussed. Every child that participated received a certificate.   
 To assess inter-rater reliability, 35% of randomly selected video were 
independently rated by a research associate that was blind to the randomisation.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Results 
3.1. Overview 
 This chapter is presented in eight sections. Section 3.2 describes the treatment of 
data and how it was screened for errors, outliers and missing data. Section 3.3 presents 
the demographic data for the experimental groups, including gender, age and ethnicity. 
Section 3.4 describes the internal consistency for new measures and descriptive data for 
all variables.  Attention is given to the distribution of data, the treatment of outliers and 
the transformation of non-normally distributed data. Section 3.5 presents the inter-rater 
reliability for checks, hesitations, reassurance seeking and reassurance giving. Section 
3.6 gives an interim summary of the results presented in the previous part of the chapter 
and describes the data analysis strategy. Section 3.7 presents the results, including the 
manipulation check. Finally, section 3.8 summarises the results in relation to the 
research hypothesis.  
3.2 Treatment of Data 
 Data was entered into SPSS and screened for errors, outliers and missing data. If 
unusual data was found, these were checked against the original questionnaires to make 
sure that no errors had been made. There was no missing data. 
3.3 Demographic Data 
 Demographic data for the whole sample and for the experimental groups are 
shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Gender and age of participants.   
 
N Males Females Mean age SD age 
Whole Sample 52 21 31 10.10 0.83 
High Responsibility                          26 9 17   9.90 0.86 
Control Group 26 12 14 10.40 0.75 
  
 Most participants were White British (86.5%). The remaining participants were 
White non-British (3.8%), Mixed Race (3.8%), Asian or Asian British (1.9%) and Other 
Ethnic Group (3.8%). Seventy three percent of children had a family history or a close 
friend with nut allergies.  
3.4 Internal Consistency of the Questionnaire Measure and Descriptive Statistics 
3.4.1 Internal Consistency of the Questionnaire Measure 
 The internal consistency of the STAIC and CRAS was explored. As the STAIC 
was used before and after the task it was important to assess its internal consistency. 
This was to make sure that any changes in STAIC score could be accurately attributed 
to the experimental manipulation. The internal consistency of the recently developed 
CRAS was also explored. This information is displayed in Table 2.  
Table 2  
Internal consistency for STAIC and CRAS.  
 Cronbach alpha coefficient (α) 
STAIC .83 
CRAS .79 
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3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 The distribution of the data was visually examined using histograms and outliers 
were checked using box plots. Skew and kurtosis were assessed by dividing their value 
by the standard error (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Z scores greater than 2.58 or less 
than –2.58 were significant at the .01 level. Where data were not normally distributed 
log and square root transformations were used to improve the distribution if possible. 
Data are presented for the whole sample and both of the groups. Any variables with 
significant skew and/or kurtosis are highlighted in the following tables.  
 In order to improve the distribution of skewed data, significant outliers were 
reduced to the next largest value + 1. Due to the relatively small sample size, significant 
outliers were defined as z scores greater than 2 or less than -2.  
 The following table (Table 3) shows the descriptive data for all the measures. In 
cases when skewed data was improved by reducing significant outliers, adjusted data 
has been displayed.  
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for measures.  
Group N Range Mean SD Median Skew Kurtosis 
Total SCAS 
Whole Group 52 45 24.26 10.56 23.50 .37 -.24 
High Resp[a] 26 38 24.46 11.10 22.50 .32 -.77 
Control 26 45 24.46 10.30 24.40 .47     .69 
OCD Subscale 
Whole Group   52 11     4.75   2.47  5.00 .33          -.20 
High Resp   26 11     4.92   2.81  5.00    .46               -.47            
Control   26  8     4.58   2.12  5.00 -.16         -.35      
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CDI-S 
Whole Group   52      9     1.63      2.14     1.00   *1.97        *4.25 
High Resp   26      9     1.15      1.97       .50      *2.95   *10.13 
Control   26      9          2.12        2.23       2.00      *1.50     *2.78 
Adjusted Pre-task STAIC 
Whole Group   52    21        26.17        4.72     26.22        .12             .66      
High Resp   26    15   24.69        4.71    24.50       -.21             -.12                  
Control   26    17   27.65        4.32     28.50       -.08             -.44            
Adjusted Post-task STAIC 
Whole Group   52    31   24.44        6.33     24.50       -.52                1.16            
High Resp   26    23   22.90           6.89         24.00     -1.02              .23           
Control   26    19        25.96        5.42     25.50         .90           .15          
Adjusted BAI 
Whole Group   52       16          5.12        4.10       4.50      1.00           .61               
High Resp   26       15          4.46           3.88       3.00      1.17         1.22      
Control   26       16          5.77        4.27       5.50        .89           .52     
CRAS 
Whole Group   52       75        75.88      15.50         78.00          -.33              .05           
High Resp   26       53        75.54      14.84     81.50          -.54          -.61           
Control   26       75        76.23      16.51     76.50          -.21           .63                 
Total score pre-task perceived responsibility 
Whole Group 52 16        4.10           3.57               4.00            1.38        * 2.35        
High Resp 26  9              3.60           2.82          3.00             .45                           -1.03                  
Control 26 16       4.60            4.17            4.00        *1.43       1.95                    
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Adjusted Post-Task perceived responsibility 
Whole Group 52 13   3.60           3.66          2.50        1.00  -.01     
High Resp 26 13        4.23           4.01            3.00         .84  -.48                
Control 26 11        2.96           3.20              2.00        1.13   .55               
p< 0.01*      [a] High Resp refers to high responsibility group 
 3.4.2.1 Spence Children’s Anxiety Scale (SCAS; Spence, 1998). The mean scores 
on the SCAS were below the mean clinical cut off of 42.48 (Spence 1998). Four 
children had scores above the clinical cut off of 42.48 and their parents were informed 
by letter (as outlined in the Methods section 2.5.3). Mean scores on the OCD subscale 
of the SCAS ranged from 4.6-4.9, slightly lower than the 6.09 reported by Spence 
(1998). Data for both the SCAS and the OCD subscale was normally distributed (see 
Table 3).   
 3.4.2.2 Children’s Depression Inventory – Short Form (CDI-S; Kovacs, 
1985).The descriptive data for CDI-S is outlined in Table 3. A T score higher than 65 is 
generally considered to be clinically significant and was used as the clinical cut off in 
the present study.  No children reported CDI-S scores above 65.  
 CDI-S distribution was significantly positively skewed. A log transformation 
was performed on these data, which improved the distribution of scores. Table 4 shows 
the transformed values of skewness and kurtosis. 
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Table 4 
Transformed values of skewness and kurtosis for CDI-S.  
Group N Skewness SE Kurtosis SE 
Whole Group 52   .52             .33     -.68          .64              
High Resp 26 1.11                .46      .91      .89                     
Control 26   .01       .46    1.01             .89            
  
3.4.2.3 The State Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children (STAIC; Spielberger, Edwards, 
Lushene, Montouri & Platzek, 1973). Pre-task and post-task STAIC scores were 
significantly negatively skewed in the high responsibility group. With the pre-task 
STAIC, visual inspection of these data revealed four significant outliers (z=2.74, 
z=2.60, z=3.01, z=3.15; p=0.01). With the post-task STAIC scores, two significant 
outliers were revealed (z=3, p=0.01; z=3.29, p=0.01). With both pre-group and post-
task data, reducing significant outliers to the next largest value +1 improved 
distribution. Adjusted descriptive statistics for pre and post STAIC has been reported in 
Table 3.  
 3.4.2.4 Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1993).The distribution of the 
BAI was significantly positively skewed in the control group.  There was one 
significant outlier in the control group (z=3.24, p=.01). Reducing significant outliers to 
the next largest value improved distribution. These adjusted values have been reported 
in Table 3.  
 3.4.2.5 Children’s Responsibility Attitude Scale (CRAS, Salkovskis & Williams, 
2004). The distribution of the CRAS data were not skewed and is presented in Table 3. 
Mean scores in this study are slightly higher than those reported by Reeves et al. (2010) 
of 69.68 but slightly lower than those reported by Reynolds et al. (submitted) of 90.44.  
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 3.4.2.6 Measure of perceived responsibility (perception of influence, probability 
of harm, and severity of harm). The total score for perceived responsibility measure was 
analysed. The data for perceived responsibility were positively skewed and is presented 
in Table 3. Data from the pre-task were transformed to the square root and improved the 
distribution of scores (See Table 5). Visual inspection of the post-task data revealed 
three significant outliers (z=2.42, z=2.16, z=2.94; p=0.01). Reducing significant outliers 
to the next largest value improved distribution. The adjusted values for post-task data 
have been reported in Table 5. 
Table 5  
Transformed values of skewness and kurtosis for pre-task total perceived responsibility. 
Group N Skewness SE Kurtosis SE 
Whole Group 52 .47 .33    .05 .65 
High Resp 26 .12 .46 -1.01 .89 
Control 26 .56 .46    .22 .89 
p< 0.01* 
The perception of influence, probability of harm and severity of harm subscales that 
make up this measure were then analysed separately for the whole sample and each of 
the experimental groups. Data are presented at baseline and after the experimental task.  
 3.4.2.6.1 Perception of influence subscale. Table 6 shows descriptive data for 
the perception of influence subscale. The distribution of baseline data on the perception 
of influence subscale was normally distributed for the high responsibility group (z=2.42, 
p>.01) and the control group (z= 1.10, p>.01). Distribution of post-task data for the high 
responsibility group and the control group was also normally distributed.  
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Table 6 
Descriptive statistics for the perception of influence subscale 
Group N Mean SD Median Skew Kurtosis 
Baseline Score 
Whole Group 52 .92 .89 .50 *.99 .32 
High Resp 26 .60 .60 .55 1.10 .60 
Control 26 1.25 1.01 1.0 .50 -.63 
After Task 
Whole Group 52 1.14 1.10 1.00 *.90 .20 
High Resp 26 1.25 1.19 1.0 1.04 .43 
Control 26 1.06 1.03 1.0 .69 -.32 
*p < 0.01 
 
 3.4.2.6.2 Probability of harm subscale. Descriptive data for the probability of 
harm subscale are presented in Table 7. The distribution of baseline score on the 
probability of harm subscale was normally distributed for the high responsibility group 
(z= 1.63, p>.01) and the control group (z=2.4, p>.01). The distribution of the data for 
the post-task scores on probability of harm subscale for the control group, indicated 
significant skewness, (z=4.85, p<.01); and kurtosis (z=5.5, p<.01).  
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Table 7 
Descriptive statistics for probability of harm subscale  
Group N Mean SD Median Skew Kurtosis 
Baseline Score 
Whole Group 52 .72 .71 .50 *.87 .02 
High Resp 26 .79 .71 .50 .74 -.10 
Control 26 .65 .72 .50 1.08 .56 
After Task 
Whole Group 52 .42 .63 .00 *1.47 *1.48 
High Resp 26 .54 .62 .50 .96 -.20 
Control 26 .31 .63 .00 *2.20 *4.9 
*p < 0.01 
As the data were not normally distributed, they were transformed using log 
transformations. A log transformation did not improve the distribution. A square root 
transformation was employed, but this did not improve the distribution of the data 
either. As data were not normally distributed for the variable of perceptions of harm, 
non-parametric tests were used in the analyses.  
 3.4.2.6.3 Severity of harm subscale. Table 8 shows the descriptive data for the 
severity of harm subscale. The distribution of the baseline score on the severity of harm 
subscale was significantly positively skewed for the control group (z= 4.03, p< 0.01). 
The distribution of the baseline scores for the control group also indicated significant 
kurtosis (z=3.15, p< 0.01). The distribution of the post task scores on the severity of 
harm subscale was significantly positively skewed for the high responsibility group 
(z=2.74, p<0.01) and the control group (z= 5.77, p<0.01). The distribution of the data 
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on the post score also indicated significant kurtosis in the control group (z= 8.14, 
p<0.01). 
Table 8 
Descriptive statistics for severity of harm subscale  
Group N Mean SD Median Skew Kurtosis 
Baseline Score 
Whole Group 52 .42 .61 .00 *1.48 *1.87 
High Resp 26 .44 .52 .25 .72 -.83 
Control 26 .40 .69 .00 *1.84 *2.80 
After Task 
Whole Group 52 .39 .62 .00 *1.78 *2.71 
High Resp 26 .50 .62 .50 *1.25 .88 
Control 26 0.30 .60 .00 *2.63 *7.22 
*p < 0.01 
As the data were not normally distributed, they were transformed using log 
transformations. A log transformation did not improve the distribution. A square root 
transformation was also employed, but this did not improve distribution either. As data 
were not normally distributed for the variable of perceptions of severity of harm, non-
parametric tests were used in the analyses.   
 3.4.2.7 Behavioural Measures. Table 9 presents descriptive statistics for child 
behavioural measures of adjusted checks, hesitations, reassurance seeking, and time.  
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Table 9 
Descriptive statistics for child behavioural dependent variables. 
Group N Mean SD Median Skew Kurtosis 
Adjusted Checks 
Whole Group 52      6.25 3.50 6.00  .20 -.44 
High Resp 26      7.50 3.52 7.50 -.17 -.49            
Control 26      5.00             3.05               5.00           .47                             .76                                         
Hesitations 
Whole Group 52      2.38    3.76                          1.00  *2.32          *4.95            
High Resp 26      3.73    4.81           1.50                *1.50                1.01                
Control 26      1.04                           1.40                   .00                 *1.23              .91                              
Reassurance Seeking 
Whole Group 52      1.81    2.70           1.00                            2.03                4.00            
High Resp 26      2.96                                             3.30        1.50               *1.28                    .93                  
Control 26        .65                                           1.13               .00                 *2.56          *8.16              
Time 
Whole Group 52  343.33                                                                 85.14          323.50         *.86       .22            
High Resp 26  379.88              84.77     348.00       .82          -.61           
Control 26  306.77              69.44     304.00     1.03       1.52      
*p < 0.01  
 In the inflated responsibility group checks were positively skewed.  Two outliers 
were adjusted to the next largest value and this improved the distribution (z=4.03, 
p=0.01; z=3.64, p=0.01).  Hesitation was positively skewed in the inflated responsibility 
group and the control group. Square root transformation improved the distribution (see 
Table 10). Analyses comparing the groups on this variable used the transformed data. 
 87 
Table 10 
Transformed values of skewness and kurtosis for hesitations.  
Group N Skewness SE Kurtosis SE 
Whole Group 52 *1.61 .33 *2.16 .64 
High Resp 26 1.05 .46 -.05 .89 
Control 26  .83 .46 -.44 .89 
  
 Reassurance seeking was positively skewed in the inflated responsibility group 
and the control group. Neither the reduction of significant outliers or performing 
transformation improved the distribution.  All values were therefore retained and non-
parametric tests were used in the analysis of this data. The distribution of the time data 
were not skewed 
 Maternal reassurance giving was normally distributed (see Table 11). 
Table 11 
Descriptive statistics for maternal reassurance giving. 
                           Mean SD Median     Skew Kurtosis 
3.00 2.0 *.89         -.51        
2.88 
3.44 
3.09 2.0 .72         -.90        
Whole Group 
High Res 
Control 3.12 3.82 2.0 .97  -.50                
* p < 0.01      
  3.4.3 Between Group Comparisons on Demographic and Confounding 
Variables. Multivariate normality was checked by calculating Mahalanobis distances 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  No multivariate outliers were found in the data file. A 
Pearson’s Chi Square test revealed that there were no group differences in gender  
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χ2 (1, N=52) =1.30, p = .57, familial nut allergy χ2 (1, N=52) =0.59, p =.44 or knowledge 
of nut allergies χ2(1, N=52) =.39, p = .53. A one-way between-groups multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used compare groups on age, total SCAS, OCD 
subscale of SCAS, BAI, CRAS, CDI-S, pre-task perceived responsibility and pre-task 
STAIC. Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for normality, linearity, 
univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of co-variance matrices and 
multicollinearity, with no serious violations noted. There was a statistically significant 
difference between groups on the combined dependent variables: F (9,42)=2.77, p= 0.12; 
Wilk’ Lambda, = .63, partial eta squared =.37 . When univariate results were examined 
there was a significant between group difference on baseline state anxiety, F (1, 50) = 5.6, 
p=.02 and close to significant between group difference on baseline depression F (1, 50) = 
3.9, p=.05. State anxiety and depression was higher in the control group than in the 
inflated responsibility group. Therefore state anxiety and child depression were controlled 
in further analyses.  
3.5 Inter-Rater Reliability 
 Inter-rater reliability for hesitations, checks, reassurance seeking and reassurance 
giving was measured through intra class correlations. Data from 18 participants (35%) 
was randomly selected and rated by two researchers, one of whom was blind to the 
randomisation.  The reliability co-efficients were all above .8 (see Table 12) which 
demonstrates good inter-rater reliability (Landis & Koch, 1977).  
 89 
Table 12 
Intra-class correlation co-efficients for checks, hesitations, reassurance seeking and 
reassurance giving. 
Variable                                                                                          ρ 
Checks 
Hesitations 
Reassurance Seeking 
Reassurance Giving 
0.82 
0.80 
0.92 
0.92 
N = 18 
3.6 Interim Summary 
 The STAIC, CRAS and perceived responsibility were internally consistent. The 
SCAS, SCAS OCD subscale, CRAS, and time taken to complete the task and 
reassurance giving were normally distributed. Measures of anxiety (BAI, STAIC), 
depression (CDI), perceived responsibility, checks, hesitations and reassurance seeking 
behaviour were not normally distributed. The distribution of maternal anxiety, child 
state anxiety scores, perceived responsibility post task and checks were improved by 
reducing any significant outliers to the next highest score +1.  Pre-task perceived 
responsibility and hesitations was successfully transformed using a square root 
transformation and child depression was transformed to the log10. The distribution of 
reassurance seeking was not improved by transforming the data or reducing outliers.  At 
baseline the control group reported higher anxiety (STAIC) and depression (CDI) than 
the high responsibility group. These variables will therefore be controlled for in future 
analyses. There was no significant between group difference in gender, knowledge of 
nut allergy, total SCAS, OCD subscale of SCAS, BAI, CRAS or pre-task inflated 
responsibility scores. Intra-class correlations revealed that there was a high level of 
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inter-rater reliability on all of the behavioural measures. The remainder of this chapter 
highlights how these data were used to test the research hypotheses.  
3.7 Results 
3.7.1 Setting Condition 1-Manipulation Check  
 To check if the experimental manipulation had been successful, a one-way 
between groups analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted to compare between 
groups differences on total perceived responsibility.  
 The independent variable was group (inflated responsibility or control) and the 
dependent variable was adjusted post task total perceived responsibility. As raw scores 
were not normally distributed, participants transformed baseline responsibility ratings 
were used as the covariate in this analysis. Preliminary checks were conducted to ensure 
that there was no violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity, homogeneity of 
variance, homogeneity of regression slopes, and reliability of covariate. Levene’s test 
was used to determine homogeneity of variance and revealed that variances were equal 
(p=.42). The relationship between the covariate and dependent variable was examined 
using Spearman’s Rho correlation and scatter plots. A significant linear relationship was 
observed (r=.49; p<.01). Assumptions of homogeneity of regression slopes had also 
been met (F=.08; df=1,44, p=.22).  
 There was a significant group difference in perceived responsibility after 
controlling for baseline perceived responsibility, F=5.89; df=1,49, p=.019, partial eta 
squared, 0.11 (medium to large effect size). The mean for the adjusted post-task 
perceived responsibility are shown in Figure 2. The high responsibility group had higher 
mean post-task responsibility perceptions (M=4.32, SD 4.01) than the control group 
(M=2.96, SD 3.22).  
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Figure 2. Posttask measures of perception of responsibility by group. 
3.7.2 Setting Condition 2-State Anxiety  
An ANCOVA revealed that there were no group differences in post-task state 
anxiety, while controlling for baseline state anxiety, F(1,49) = 0.11, p=.75, partial eta 
squared = 0.02. Therefore, children in the inflated responsibility group did not become 
more anxious compared to those in the control group. Results from Levene’s test found 
that the assumption of homogeneity of variance to be satisfactory (p= .33).  
3.7.3 Dependent Variables: Between Group Comparisons. 
 A MANCOVA was conducted to examine between group differences in time, 
checking and hesitations while controlling for baseline CDI-S and pre-task STAIC. 
Results from Levene’s test found that the assumption of homogeneity of variance to be 
satisfactory. There was a significant multivariate between- group difference in 
behaviour F ( 3, 46) = 4.40, p= .008. Univariate F values showed that there was a 
significant group differences in time, F(1,48) =10.1, p=.003, checking  F(1,48) =6.7, 
p=.012 and hesitations F(1,48) = 4.57, p=.038. The high responsibility group took 
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longer to complete the task, checked more and hesitated more than the control group 
(see Figure 3). 
 As reassurance seeking was not normally distributed, a Mann-Whitney U test 
was used. There was a statistically significant difference in reassurance seeking between 
the two groups, Z=-3.26, p=.001, with mean reassurance seeking being higher in the 
high responsibility group (see Figure 3).  
 Figure 3 shows that children in the inflated responsibility took longer to 
complete the task, hesitated, checked and sought reassurance more often. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Checks Hesitations Reassurance Seeking Reassurance Giving
M
e
an
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
M
ea
n
 
/ S
ec
o
n
ds
High Responsibility Control Time High Response Time Control
 
 Figure 3: Graph showing mean time, checks, hesitations, reassurance seeking 
and reassurance giving in each group.  
 An independent sample t-test showed that there was no significant group 
difference in maternal reassurance giving, t(50) = -.24, p=.81.  The groups were also 
compared in an ANCOVA, controlling for child baseline state anxiety; this was not 
significant (F=.026; df=1,49, p=.87). Results have been displayed in Figure 3.  
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3.7.4 Perceptions of Influence on outcome, Probability of Harm and Severity of Harm.   
 The two experimental groups were compared to determine whether there were 
significant differences in perceptions of influence on outcome, probability of harm and 
severity of harm.  An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare baseline 
scores on the perceptions of influence subscale. There was a significant difference in 
baseline scores for the control group (M=1.25, SD = 1.01) and the high responsibility 
group (M=0.60, SD =0.60; t (50) = -2.8, p= .007, two tailed). Post-task scores on the 
perception of influence subscale were therefore compared using an ANCOVA, with 
baseline scores being using as the covariate. Preliminary checks were conducted to 
ensure that there was no violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity, 
homogeneity of variance, homogeneity of regression slopes, and reliable measures of 
the co-variate. After adjusting for baseline scores, there was a significant difference 
between the two groups on post-task scores on the perception of influence subscale, 
F(1,49) = 3.7, p=0.05, partial eta squared value of .07 (medium effect size). The high 
responsibility group had higher mean post-task perception of influence (Unadjusted 
M=1.23, SD 1.19; Adjusted M= 1.43, SE, .20) than the control group (Unadjusted 
M=1.06, SD 1.03; Adjusted M = 0.86, SE, .20). The adjusted marginal means for the 
post-task perceptions of influence are shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Graph showing post-task adjusted marginal mean for perception of influence 
in each group. 
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 As the data from the probability of harm and severity of harm subscale was not 
normally distributed, non-parametric Man-Whitney U tests were used. There were no 
significant differences between groups at baseline on their scores on the responsibility 
of harm dimension, probability of harm dimension. There were significant differences 
between groups on their post scores with regards to both probability of harm; U = 239, 
z=-2.05, p=0.04, r=0.28(small to medium effect size); and severity of harm U = 242, z=-
2.00, p=0.05, r= 0.28 (small to medium effect size). See Table 13.  
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Table 13 
Group comparison on probability and severity of harm baseline and after task 
 Control High Responsibility 
 Mean Rank S.D Mean Rank S.D 
                            Before Task 
Probability 24.85 0.72 28.15 0.71 
Severity 24.92 0.69 28.08 0.52 
                            After Task 
Probability 22.69 0.63 30.31 0.62 
Severity 22.83 0.60 30.17 0.62 
Figure 5: Graph showing post task mean rank for probability and severity of harm in 
each group. 
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3.8 Exploratory Correlational Analyses 
 Combining the two groups together, the relationship between reassurance 
seeking/reassurance giving (total and sub-category scores) and other variables of 
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interest (both mother and child) were explored using a correlational approach. For 
variables that were normally distributed Pearson’s correlation coefficient was used, and 
for variables that were not normally distributed Spearman’s correlation was used. 
Results are displayed in Table 14. 
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Table 14.  
Correlations between reassurance seeking/reassurance giving and other variables of 
interest (two groups combined).  
Variable ReasS  
Total² 
ReasG 
Total¹ 
Glance¹ Help¹ Unprompted 
Reassurance¹ 
SCAS¹ .104 .19 .19 .01 .98 
OCD¹ -.02 .24 .24 .03 .15 
CRAS¹ .05 -.08 -.14 .01 -.02 
CDI¹ -.18 .07 .09 -.09 .01 
Mum BAI¹ .07 .13 .17 -.10 -.09 
Post-STAIC¹ .02 .25 *.27 -.21 .26 
Post Resp ¹ .06 .23 *.28 .10 .09 
Post Influence² -.03 .15 .20 .11 .06 
Post Prob² .26 .22 .21 .17 .25 
Post Sev² .23 .22 .25 .12 .07 
Hesit¹ **.40 .08 .03 .11 .06 
Checks¹ **.39 .09 .12 .04 -.12 
Time¹ *.29 *.31 .24 *.31 .24 
ReasS² - .18 .27 .20 .07 
ReasG¹ - - **.92 **-.43 **.65 
Glance ¹ - - - .77 **.56 
Help¹ - - - - **.45 
Note. N=52. Prob. = probability of harm. Sev= severity of harm,  Post Resp = Total perception 
of responsibility post task, ReasS = Reassurance Seeking,  ReasG = Reassurance Giving. 
¹Pearsons’ correlation coefficient. ²Spearman’s correlation coefficient.  
*p < .05 one tailed ** p< .01 two tailed 
 
 Within the two groups combined, children’s reassurance seeking behaviour (as 
measured by child’s total reassurance seeking score) was significantly correlated with 
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all other OCD-type behaviours including time taken, amount of hesitations and amount 
of checks. Children’s reassurance seeking behaviour was not correlated with child’s 
overall perceived anxiety, perceptions of responsibility or mother’s reassurance giving. 
Also, mothers reassurance giving was not correlated with children’s anxiety or 
perceived responsibility. However, when mothers reassurance giving was broken down 
into sub-categories, the glancing category was significantly correlated with their child’s 
post state anxiety score (as measured by the STAIC) and their child’s post task 
perceptions of responsibility. This suggests that there is a relationship between 
children’s reported levels of perceived responsibility and anxiety and mother’s 
reassurance giving in the form of glancing. This partially supports a number anxiety 
models which suggests that in order to alleviate the child’s distress, a parent may 
increase their level of involvement and protection (Rapee, 2001).  
 Mothers helping behaviour was positively correlated with time. Reassurance 
giving total was significantly correlated to the three sub-categories of glancing, helping 
and unprompted reassurance. Mothers glancing and helping behaviour was significantly 
correlated with mother’s unprompted reassurance. It must be noted however, that this 
correlational analyses is purely exploratory in nature and therefore any findings should 
be interpreted with caution.   
3.9 Summary of Results 
 This section summarises the findings in relation to the setting conditions and 
each research hypothesis.  
3.9.1 Setting Condition 1 – Manipulation Check.  
  The manipulation check showed that children assigned to the high 
responsibility group had higher perceived responsibility than the control group. 
Therefore the experimental manipulation was successful.  
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3.9.2 Setting Condition 2 – State Anxiety. 
 There were no group differences in post-task state anxiety, while controlling for 
baseline state anxiety. Therefore, after completing the sorting task children in the 
inflated responsibility condition were not more anxious than those in the control group. 
3.9.3 Hypothesis 1- Participants in the high responsibility group will take longer to 
complete the sorting task and display a significantly greater number of checks, 
hesitations and reassurance seeking behaviours, than the control group.  
 Children in the high responsibility group took longer to complete the task and 
also checked, hesitated and sought reassurance more often than those in the control 
group.   Therefore hypothesis 1 was supported.  
3.9.4 Hypothesis 2- Participants in the high responsibility group will report higher 
perceptions of influence and higher probability and severity of harm after the sorting 
task than the control group.  
 Participants in the high responsibility group reported significantly higher 
perceptions of influence, probability and severity of harm after the sorting task than 
those in the control group. Therefore hypothesis 2 was supported.  
3.9.5 Hypothesis 3 – Mothers with children in the high responsibility group will provide 
more reassurance than those with children in the control group.  
 An independent sample t-test showed that mothers with the children in the high 
responsibility group did not provide more reassurance than those with children in the 
control group. Across both groups, mother’s reassurance giving was not associated with 
their child’s reassurance seeking.  Therefore hypothesis 3 was not supported. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Overview 
 The purpose of this chapter is to consider the results of the study in relation to 
each setting condition and hypothesis and to relate these findings to relevant literature. 
This is followed by a critique of the methodology and a discussion of the theoretical 
implications of the results. Directions for future research are considered concluding with 
an overall summary of the research findings.  
4.2 Previous Research and Current Findings 
 This section reviews the results in relation to each setting condition and 
hypothesis and relates these findings to relevant empirical literature. As only limited 
research has investigated the relationship between childhood OCD and inflated 
responsibility, research from adult populations will also be considered.   
4.2.1 Setting Condition 1- Manipulation Check 
 Children assigned to the high responsibility group reported significantly higher 
perceived responsibility than the control group. Analyses revealed a partial eta squared 
effect size of 0.11. This is a medium to large effect size according to guidelines outlined 
by Cohen (1998) and suggests that the sorting task was successful in manipulating 
responsibility.  
 These results are similar to those reported by previous studies. For example, 
Reeves et al. (2010) found that there was a significant post-task difference in the 
perceptions of influence between the high responsibility group and the reduced 
responsibility group, U=98, p=.00, r=-.64 (large effect size) and between the no 
responsibility group and the reduced responsibility group, U=169, p=.00, r=-.45 
(medium to large effect size). There was no significant difference between the high 
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responsibility group and the no manipulation group. When comparing the strength of 
the current manipulation to previous studies it is also important to consider the 
difference in methodology. For example, Reeves et al. (2010) chose to evaluate the 
successfulness of manipulation based on scores from the perception of influence 
subscale alone, rather than a score based on all three subscales. Also, the lack of control 
group in the study by Reeves et al. (2010), it is difficult to draw any direct comparisons 
between the study by Reeves et al. (2010) and the current study. 
 Reynolds et al. (submitted) on the other hand decided to measure overall  
inflated responsibility based on the total of all three subscales that make up the 
responsibility measure e.g. perception of influence, probability of harm and severity of 
harm. This is similar to the current study which also used scores from all three subscales 
to calculate overall perception of responsibility. Reynolds et al. (submitted), also 
included a control study. In the study by Reynolds et al. (submitted), significant 
differences were observed between groups, on measures of post-task inflated 
responsibility, when the effect of baseline differences was controlled for (F = 3.392; df 
= 2, 59, p = 0.04). The results of pairwise comparisons indicated that the high 
responsibility group had significantly higher perceptions of responsibility than the 
reduced responsibility group (M = .275, SD  = .106, p = .04). However, there were no 
significant differences between the high responsibility and the control group, or the 
reduced responsibility and the control group. Unfortunately, Reynolds et al. (submitted) 
did not report any effect sizes.  
 The small to medium effect sizes reported in this study compared to the medium 
to large effect sizes reported in previous studies may be due to a number of reasons. 
One explanation is that the mother’s presence during the task may have inadvertently 
reduced the child’s feelings of responsibility. For example, rather than assuming all 
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responsibility themselves, they may have felt like their mother’s presence allowed them 
to absolve themselves from some of the responsibility, therefore reducing their 
perception of influence, severity and probability of harm. However, it is important to 
remember that unlike the study by Reynolds et al. (submitted), the manipulation in this 
study did appear to be powerful enough to differentiate between the high responsibility 
group and the control group.  
 Results from this study are also in keeping with experimental research that has 
manipulated responsibility in non-clinical adults. For example, Ladouceur et al. (1995) 
found that significantly higher perceptions of responsibility were reported by 
participants in the high responsibility condition compared to those in the low 
responsibility condition. Making comparisons to the study by Ladouceur et al (1995) is 
particularly important as only two conditions were compared and the low responsibility 
group is similar to the control group used in the present study.  
 This study and previous literature suggest that perceived responsibility can be 
manipulated in a group of non-clinical children and that findings are similar to those 
found in adult populations.  
4.2.2 Setting Condition 2- State anxiety  
.  There were no group differences in post-task state anxiety. This does not support 
Salkovskis’  inflated responsibility model of OCD (1985) which suggests that an 
increase in perceived responsibility is accompanied by an increase in discomfort and 
anxiety. It also goes against findings from adult studies that have found that an increase 
in perceived responsibility has results in increased perceived discomfort and anxiety 
(Ladouceur et al., 1995; Lopatka & Rachman, 1995). However, this finding is in 
keeping with other child and adult studies by Reynolds et al. (submitted), Reeves et al. 
(2010), Bouchard, Rheaume and Ladouceur (1999), and Ladouceur et al. (1997). Barrett 
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& Healy Farrell (2003) who also found that manipulated perceived responsibility did 
not increase ratings of distress in a group of clinical adolescents and concluded that 
responsibility was not central to the presentation of OCD in children. Unfortunately, 
neither Reynolds et al. (submitted) nor Reeves et al. (2010), reported the effect size for 
perceived state anxiety so it is impossible to draw direct comparisons.  
 However, other explanations are also possible. For example, Bouchard et al., 
(1999) suggested that when individuals are allowed to participate in safety behaviours 
such as reassurance seeking and checking during the task, it is less likely that they will 
feel anxious about their performance. This is one explanation for findings in the current 
study as children were permitted to check their work as many times as they wished, 
therefore reducing their anxiety. Findings from the present study also showed that 
children’s state anxiety score were higher before the task than afterwards. A possible 
explanation for this is that some children were feeling apprehensive about what the task 
would involve and felt relieved after they completed it. In this study, one possible way 
of overcoming this would be to measure the anxiety at a different time i.e. after they had 
received the task instructions and before they completed the safety behaviours. 
4.2.3 Hypothesis 1- Participants in the high responsibility group will take longer to 
complete the sorting task and display a significantly greater number of checks, 
hesitations and reassurance seeking behaviours, than the control group.  
 Children in the high responsibility group took longer to complete the task and 
also checked, hesitated and sought reassurance more often than those in the control 
group. These findings are consistent with Reeves et al. (2010) and offer support for a 
possible causal relationship between increased perceived levels of responsibility and an 
increase in OCD type behaviours. Numerous questionnaire studies have also found a 
significant positive correlation between inflated responsibility and OCD behaviours in 
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children (Libby et al., 2004; Magnusdottir and Smuari, 2004; Matthews et al., 2007), 
however, experimental studies provide much stronger evidence. 
 However, Barret & Healy-Farrell (2003) found that inflated responsibility 
appraisals were not associated with an increase in ritualising or avoidance in children 
with OCD (Barrett & Healy-Farrell, 2003). These differences could be to do with the 
use of a more powerful experimental manipulation in the current study. For example, in 
terms of manipulating levels of perceived responsibility, Barret & Healy-Farrell (2003) 
results were considerable less remarkable than results from this study. In addition, the 
experimenter in Barret & Healy-Farrell’s (2003) study consistently observed that 
participants were particularly reluctant to accept responsibility in the high responsibility 
condition, and suggested that manipulating levels of responsibility in a sample of 
children with OCD was more difficult than anticipated.  
 The findings of the current study are also supported by previous experimental 
research with adults. Adults in a high responsibility group displayed more OCD-like 
behaviours than those in a control group (Bouchard et al., 1999; Ladouceur et al., 1995, 
Ladouceur et al. , 1997, Lopatka, 1995). In term of reassurance seeking behaviours, 
findings from this study are in line with Parrish and Radomsky (2006) who found that 
individuals in a high responsibility group reported greater urges to check and seek 
reassurance compared to the low responsibility group.  They also noted that checking 
and reassurance seeking could be functionally equivalent and/or driven by the same 
processes.  
 In summary, these findings confirm the hypothesis that links inflated 
responsibility to an increase in OCD-like behaviours in children and that these findings 
are consistent with adult studies.  
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4.2.4 Hypothesis 2- Participants in the high responsibility group will report higher 
perceptions of influence and higher perceptions of probability and severity of harm 
after the sorting task than the control group.   
 The high responsibility group reported significantly higher perceptions of 
influence (partial eta squared = 0.07; medium to large effect size), probability of harm 
(r=-.28; small to medium effect size) and severity of harm (r=-.28; small to medium 
effect size) than the control group. In line with the definition of responsibility, these 
results suggest that perceived responsibility is related to the cognitive appraisals 
involving both personal influence and potential negative outcome (probability and 
severity of harm). The aim of using a measure made up of three subscales (each of 
which measured slightly difference constructs of responsibility) was to ascertain which 
components of inflated responsibility are associated with an increase in OCD type 
behaviours. Taken in conjunction with the results from hypothesis 1, the results suggest 
that perception of influence, probability of harm and severity of harm may all be 
necessary to produce OCD type behaviours.  
 When comparing the results to previous studies, Reeves et al. (2010) also found 
that individuals in the  high responsibility group reported significantly more perceptions 
of influence (r=-.64; large effect size) probability of harm (r=-.37; medium effect size) 
and severity of harm (r=-.33; medium effect size) after the sorting task compared to the 
reduced responsibility group. However, there was no significant difference between the 
high responsibility group and the no manipulation group on all three subscales, and no 
significant difference in probability of harm and severity of harm between the no 
manipulation and the reduced responsibility group. Reeves et al. (2010) suggested that 
differences in perceptions of probability of harm and severity of harm only become 
significant when there is a significant difference in perception of influence.  
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 The effect sizes reported by Reeves et al. (2010) are extremely similar to those 
reported in the present study. Interestingly, both the present study and the study by 
Reeves et al. (2010), reported slightly larger effect sizes for perception of influence than 
for probability of harm and severity of harm. This is supported by previous studies in 
adult literature that found that perceived influence was a better predictor of perceived 
responsibility that the overestimation of negative consequences (Ladouceur, Rheaume 
& Aublet, 1997). On the other hand, Ladouceur et al. (1995) reported that non-clinical 
adults in a high responsibility condition reported significant more severity, probability, 
perceived influence and responsibility for consequences than those in the low 
responsibility condition. However, in this study, severity of harm accounted for up to 
40% of the variance and the other variables accounted for less than 5%. This 
highlighted the importance of separately assessing all of the manipulation variables and 
also suggests that the development of a more robust measure of perceptions of severity, 
probability and responsibility is needed. Indeed, the results from the present study must 
be interpreted with caution due to fact that this is a new measure. 
 Reynolds et al. (submitted) did not report findings based on the subscales on the 
responsibility measure but rather the total score of all three subscales combined. This 
means that it is impossible to compare results on the individual subscales as this 
information was not available. 
4.2.5 Hypothesis 3 – Mothers with children in the high responsibility group will provide 
more reassurance than those with children in the control group.  
 Mothers with children in the high responsibility group did not provide more 
reassurance than those with children in the control group, despite the fact that their 
children sought significantly more reassurance from them. Therefore this hypothesis 
was not supported. Across both groups mother’s reassurance giving was not associated 
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with their child’s reassurance seeking, suggesting that this was not recognised as a 
relevant signal by mothers. Thus maternal behaviours towards the child were 
independent to their child’s beliefs and behaviours. This is in contrast to previous 
research with clinical samples which suggest that OCD behaviours, such as reassurance 
seeking are related to family accommodation, such a reassurance giving (Calvocoressi 
et al., 1999).   
 There are a number of possible explanations for these findings. Firstly the use of 
a non-clinical sample may be a key factor. Previous research suggests that mothers of 
children with OCD are more likely to be overprotective and anxious than mothers of 
children who do not have OCD (Rapee, 1997). It could therefore be hypothesised that if 
a clinical sample had been used, mothers would have been generally more anxious, 
making them more likely to respond to their child’s anxiety and give reassurance. BAI 
scores from this study showed that maternal anxiety across both groups was low. Also, 
children in both groups had low levels of state anxiety.  Secondly, mothers were aware 
that responsibility was being manipulated and therefore knew that their child’s 
performance on the task did not have dangerous consequences. Thus, although children 
in the high responsibility condition sought significantly more reassurance, it is likely 
that mothers may not have reacted to their child as often as they would if they had been 
unaware. Mothers were informed about the study and it was made explicit to them that 
the outcome of the task would not impact negatively on any other children i.e. they were 
aware that sweets would not be transferred to children in schools. This decision was 
made to ensure that the children did not react to any anxiety expressed by their mothers 
regarding the outcome of the task in an attempt to minimise confounding variables. The 
fact that mothers were aware of the fictitious nature of the task allowed mothers to 
reassure their children in response to their child’s anxiety in a more naturalistic manner 
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without this being influenced by their concerned for other children’s safety. What might 
be interesting for future studies would be to investigate reassurance seeking/giving 
within the dyads if mothers were unaware of the fictitious nature of the task.  
4.3 Interim Summary 
 The aim of this study was to investigate whether the inflated responsibility 
model of OCD applied to children. It did this by experimentally manipulating perceived 
levels of responsibility on a sorting task and investigating the effects on OCD-like 
behaviours and anxiety.  The manipulation check showed that children assigned to the 
high responsibility group had higher perceived responsibility than the control group. 
There were no group differences in post-task state anxiety, perhaps because of the safety 
behaviours used by children. Children in the high responsibility group took longer to 
complete the task and also checked, hesitated and sought reassurance more often than 
those in the control group. 
 These results support a possible causal relationship between perceived 
responsibility and OCD type behaviours in non-clinical children.  
 Given the increasing literature on the role of the family in the maintenance of 
OCD behaviours, this study also aimed to investigate the impact of child’s perceived 
responsibility on mother’s reassurance giving. Mothers with children in the high 
responsibility group did not provide more reassurance than those with children in the 
control group, despite the fact that their children sought significantly more reassurance 
from them. Results also showed that mother’s reassurance giving was not associated 
with their child’s reassurance seeking. One possible explanation is the use of a non-
clinical sample. For example, given that mothers in both groups reported low levels of 
anxiety it could be hypothesised that they may not show the overprotecting and 
controlling parenting style that has found to be associated with childhood OCD. 
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Therefore, due to the low levels of anxiety reported by the children, and the fact that 
mothers knew about the true nature of the task, mothers may not have felt the need to 
intervene. Another possibility is that due to demand characteristics, mothers may not 
have responded as they normally would towards their children.  
4.4 Methodological Critique 
 The aim of this section is to discuss the strengths and limitations of the research 
design and methodology and to consider research findings in relation to these issues.  
4.4.1 Design 
 This study employed a between- subject experimental design to investigate 
whether increased perceived responsibility led to increased OCD-like behaviours and 
anxiety. One of the main advantages of experimental designs over other study designs is 
the ability to demonstrate cause and effect relationships. Thus, the experimental design 
meant that the causal variable of responsibility could be manipulated, and the outcome 
of this manipulation (in terms of OCD-like behaviors) could be measured.  This allowed 
some conclusions to be drawn about the impact of different levels of responsibility on 
anxiety and OCD-like behaviours.  
 The groups were not matched on confounding variables such as gender and age. 
Therefore baseline measures of possible confounding variables which differed between 
the groups e.g. anxiety, were controlled for in the analyses.  
4.4.2 Sample 
 One of the main strengths of this study is that it investigated the applicability of 
the inflated responsibility model of OCD to a relatively young sample.  This is a 
relatively under researched area as most childhood studies looking at the cognitive 
models of OCD have used adolescent samples (Marther & Cartwright- Hatton, 2004; 
Matthews et al., 2007). Therefore this study has contributed to the current evidence base 
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by showing that the inflated responsibility model of OCD can not only be applied to 
adolescents but also to a wider range of age groups including a non-clinical group of 
children aged 9-11 years.  
 In terms of ethnicity, the majority of the participants were white British. 
Although this is representative of the geographical area, this does mean that it may be 
difficult to generalise the findings to a more ethnically diverse population. Further 
investigations are needed to understand how ethnic differences would impact on the role 
of inflated responsibility in OCD. The response rate of 24.2% means that the 
participants may not be representative of the sampled population. It is impossible to 
know if the children who decided to take part differed from those that did not. 
 There are many advantages of using a non-clinical sample. The first advantage is 
the relative ease with which these samples can be recruited, allowing studies to have 
adequate power to test relationships between variables. The use of a non-clinical sample 
also means that ethical and practical constraints can be avoided (Gibbs, 1996) and also 
means that there are fewer competing factors (e.g. medication) that can influence the 
interpretation of the findings (Costello, 1994).  
4.4.3 Measures 
 One of the strengths of the inflated responsibility measure was that it was brief, 
used age appropriate language and demonstrated good internal consistency.  
 A strength of this study was the use of reliable and valid questionnaires to 
measure possible confounding variables such as child anxiety. However, the CRAS has 
not been validated for use with younger children. The alpha value for the CRAS in the 
present study was 0.79, demonstrating acceptable reliability. Although this measure has 
proven to be an effective measure of responsibility attitudes in children aged 10-14 
(Magnusdottir and Smari, 2004; Reeves et al., 2010), it has been suggested that some of 
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the items are too abstract for the youngest children and that such measures should 
consist of vivid scenarios or examples (Magnusdottir and Smari, 2004). In the present 
study the youngest children were 9 years old and therefore may have not understood the 
questionnaires. However, the presence of the researcher meant that children could ask 
questions and any misunderstandings could be rectified 
 Children were asked to complete a large number of questionnaires. As with all 
self report questionnaires, issues surrounding the validity of the patient’s response 
should be considered. It could also be argued that the length of time that it took to 
complete these measures may have resulted in the children becoming tired and bored 
which could in turn have impacted on their performance during the task. In an attempt 
to overcome this problem, this study used a subscale of the SCAS to measure for OCD 
symptoms, rather than a more extensive and possibly more accurate measure such as the 
Leyton Obsessional Inventory-Child Version (Berg et al., 1988). However, considering 
that OCD symptoms were not a main dependent variable in the present study, the 
subscale of the SCAS was deemed to be sufficient.  
 A possible limitation of this study is that it specifically investigates the 
relationship between inflated responsibility and checking in children. This focus on one 
subtype of OCD makes it difficult to generalise the findings to other forms of OCD and 
highlights the need for future research to investigate this relationship with other OCD 
subtypes in childhood. It is important to note however that this study is only the second 
study that experimentally investigates the impact of inflated responsibility on 
reassurance seeking and that results suggest that a causal relationship may exist between 
these two variables.   
 Another possible area open to discussion is the definition of reassurance used in 
this study. Reassurance seeking and giving was coded in line with classifications 
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utilised in previous studies (Reynolds et al., submitted). It is acknowledged that the 
glancing category may encapsulate relational factors not linked directly to reassurance 
seeking or giving e.g. a mother glancing at her child may represent concern or interest. 
It is also possible that some other idiosyncratic behaviour of the dyads were captured in 
the coding. It may be beneficial for future studies to work towards minimising these.  
4.4.4 Experimental Manipulation  
 In order to increase ecological validity, this study used an experimental task that 
was relevant and familiar to children of this age group. The manipulation appeared to be 
successful in that it increased perceived responsibility in the high responsibility group. 
It did not however, increase feelings of anxiety. Unlike previous studies (Reynolds et 
al., submitted) there was a significant difference in perceived responsibility between the 
high responsibility group and the control group. One possible explanation for these 
differing results could be to do with environmental issues. Indeed, the rationale for 
conducting the experiment in the home environment was based on previous research 
that shows that children are more likely to engage in ritualistic behaviour when in their 
home environment (King, Ollendick & Montgomery, 1995). Also, the responsibility 
model predicts that children will engage in increased checking behaviour when they feel 
a sense of ownership/increased responsibility towards their environment. However on 
reflection, as the results of the task would have an impact on unknown children within a 
school setting, not upon the child’s home or family members, the environment may be 
anticipated to have a lesser effect. Future studies may benefit for considering how the 
experimental setting impacts on the outcome of the task. Therefore, the biggest 
advantage of conducting this study in a home environment would be to give the study 
added ecological validity. 
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 A believability check was not carried out as part of this study as a similar task 
has been utilised in previous studies. It would however be interesting to determine to 
what extent children involved believed the task to be genuine as this may impact on the 
power of the manipulation.  
4.4.5 Researcher Bias   
 Researchers administering the task were aware of which experimental group the 
child had been allocated to and this could have resulted in systematic bias (Tilly, 1996). 
Ideally the researcher should be blind to this information but this was not possible. 
Therefore 35% of video recordings of the child and mother’s behaviours were rated by 
an independent rater blind to the randomisation.    
4.5 Implications of the Study 
4.5.1 Inflated Responsibility Model 
 The findings suggest that the inflated responsibility model of OCD (Salkovskis, 
1985) is applicable to a group of non-clinical children aged 9-11 years. Children in the 
high responsibility group checked significantly more than those in the control group and 
sought more reassurance from their mothers. This supports the idea that reassurance 
seeking and checking may serve similar functions, i.e. to reduce anxiety by minimising 
the likelihood and perceived responsibility of the negative outcome (Rachman, 2002).  
 Although Salkovskis suggests that responsibility appraisals are central to the 
development and maintenance of all sub-types of OCD, this study only focused on one 
sub-type of OCD, namely checking. On investigating the function of responsibility in 
other OC symptom clusters, Yorulmaz et al. (2008) found that cleaning rituals were 
more associated with responsibility based on preventing danger whereas obsessive 
rumination was based on self-dangerousness of intrusive thoughts. It is therefore 
possible that the role of inflated responsibility is very different depending on the sub-
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group being investigated. Comparing results from this study to other studies using 
different subtypes must therefore be done with caution.  
4.5.2 Implications for a Cognitive Theory of OCD in Childhood 
 The findings of this study build on the current body of literature investigating 
the applicability of cognitive models of OCD to children and lend particular support to 
the inflated responsibility model.  
 There is an increasing body of literature highlighting the importance of context 
and family influence in the aetiology and maintenance of childhood OCD. It has been 
suggested that childhood disorders can not be understood without considering the 
impact of the family and that any model of childhood psychopathology must 
incorporate these factors (Turner, 2006). Although this is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, this study attempted to incorporate this idea by not only investigating child 
reassurance seeking behaviour but also mother’s reassurance giving behaviours in the 
context of their own home. Results from this study showed that child reassurance 
seeking was not associated with maternal reassurance giving. Further research is clearly 
needed in this area. 
4.5.3 Clinical Implications 
 The findings from this study provide preliminary evidence for the link between 
inflated responsibility beliefs and OCD behaviours in childhood. This has potential 
clinical implications in terms of assessment, formulation and treatment of childhood 
OCD. During the assessment process it would seem appropriate to measure a child’s 
perceived level of responsibility as well as investigating other cognitive appraisals such 
as meta-cognitive beliefs and TAF. It is important to remember however, that each 
presenting child is different and that attempting to apply one model to all children 
would be inappropriate. Intervention should be tailored to the individual based on a 
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formulation of the presenting problem. In terms of measuring responsibility beliefs, the 
internal consistency of the CRAS in the present study suggests that it may be an 
appropriate questionnaire for use with children aged 9-11 years old. In terms of 
formulation, the inclusion of inflated responsibility beliefs may lead the individual to 
develop a deeper understanding of how these unhelpful beliefs are impacting on their 
symptoms which in turn could be challenged through cognitive therapy.  
 In terms of intervention, the present findings suggest that responsibility-related 
issues should be addressed in the treatment of OCD in children. Specific cognitive 
methods designed to challenge responsibility beliefs in childhood have already been 
developed. One such cognitive method is the responsibility pie. In this technique, 
children are asked to list all the factors that they believe have contributed to a 
catastrophic event. They are then asked to assign a relevant portion of the responsibility 
pie to each factor. When asked to assign their own responsibility from what remains 
they are often surprised to find how little is left. The aim of this technique is to help 
shape more realistic attitudes about their own responsibility, to highlight the difficulty 
of partitioning responsibility and to emphasise the multitude of factors involved.  
 Current treatment approaches for OCD also focus on the possible negative 
impact of reassurance seeking on the therapeutic process. For example, reassurance 
seeking allows the individual to reduce their feelings of responsibility which in turn 
reduces their associated feelings of anxiety. This concept has been supported by the 
findings from the present study which found an inverse relationship between anxiety 
and reassurance seeking, even when reassurance was not provided. In terms of 
treatment, this can become particularly problematic when carrying out behavioural 
experiments, as the involvement of the therapist means that the child feels like their 
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responsibility is shared. Throughout treatment it is therefore important that children are 
gradually encouraged to carry out their experiments alone (Waite, 2009).  
 In terms of family involvement, many parents report finding it very hard not to 
respond to their child’s request for reassurance, particularly because it is accompanied 
with such high levels of distress. In these situations, Waite (2009) stresses the 
importance of using formulation with the family and the child to illustrate the cycle of 
reassurance seeking. Using a formulation of the problem, he suggests that the therapist 
should guide the child to draw an arrow from reassurance back to the belief. This shows 
that although the reassurance provides initial relief it ends up making the problem 
worse. The therapist can then ask the child whether they still think it is helpful to ask for 
reassurance or for their parents to give them reassurance. With the child’s help the 
therapist can compile a list of things that their parents could do to help. He also states 
the important of encouraging parents to withdraw from giving reassurance gradually to 
avoid the possible distress that could occur if the reassurance was withdrawn too 
quickly.  
4.5.4 Recommendations for Future Research.  
 The following section will suggest possible ways to overcome the limitations of 
the present study as well as suggesting possible future research.  
 Findings from the present study indicated that children’s perceived levels of 
responsibility were not related to their reported levels of anxiety. As mentioned 
previously, this may have been because children were permitted to engage in checking 
behaviours. In future research, a possible adaptation of the task would be to ask children 
to ‘post’ the sweets into boxes. This would mean that the children would be unable to 
retrieve the sweets or change their minds. Instead, the children could be asked to keep a 
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note of the amount of times they felt the urge to check or the times when they believed 
that they had made a mistake.  
 In order to investigate maintaining factors, single case experiments that 
demonstrate temporal relationships between changing cognitive processes and changes 
in OC symptoms could be interesting. Further investigations comparing cognitive 
appraisal such as responsibility attitudes in children and adults could also be useful in 
understanding the development of inflated responsibility across the lifespan. 
 Further experimental studies demonstrating the causal role of cognitive biases in 
the formation of OC symptoms would be useful. Studies could investigate the specific 
cognitive appraisals associated with the different subtypes of OCD rather than just 
checking behaviour, which in turn would allow us to tailor our interventions 
accordingly. An investigation of certain constructs found to be important in adult 
literature, such as the role of perfectionism and intolerance of uncertainty in OCD could 
also be interesting (Bouchard et al., 1999; Rheaume, Ladouceur & Freeston, 2000). 
 Further investigations into the role of the family in the development and 
maintenance of childhood OCD would allow us to gain further insight into the impact of 
contextual issues and highlight the importance of family involvement during treatment. 
In terms of the relationship between reassurance seeking and reassurance giving it 
would be interesting to build on the present study by manipulating mothers reassurance 
giving and observing its effect on the child’s OC behaviours.  
4.6 Overall Summary and Conclusions 
 In conclusion, the aim of this study was to investigate whether the inflated 
responsibility model of OCD (Salkovskis, 1985) applied to children. Although there is 
now a large body of evidence for the role of cognitive factors in the development and 
maintenance of OCD in adults (Ladouceur, et al., 1995, Wilson & Chambless, 1999), 
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very few studies have investigated how well these cognitive models apply to the 
children. Recently a number of studies have tried to address this issue however there 
have been a number of methodological limitations. For example, the use of 
observational designs has meant that causal relationships between cognitive processes 
and OC symptoms could not be established. 
 This study therefore used an experimental design to examine the causal 
relationship between perceived inflated responsibility and childhood OCD in 9-11 year 
olds. It did this by experimentally manipulating levels of perceived responsibility during 
a sorting task. Results showed that children in the high responsibility group took longer 
to complete the task, checked, hesitated and sought more reassurance than those in the 
control group. This study therefore offers preliminary support for the link between 
increased perceived responsibility and increased OCD behaviours in children.  
 On a wider scale, findings from this study also provide evidence for the 
application of the inflated responsibility model to childhood OCD. The findings also 
support the idea that there is continuity between childhood and adult OCD, however 
developmental differences must also be into consideration. Due to methodological 
limitations however, these findings are preliminary.  
 A second aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between child 
reassurance seeking and maternal reassurance giving. Mothers with children in the high 
responsibility group did not provide more reassurance than those with children in the 
control group, despite the fact that their children sought significantly more reassurance 
from them. 
 In terms of clinical implications, the findings from this study support the use of 
cognitive interventions in the treatment of childhood OCD. However, due to the various 
limitations of the current treatment methods, further development of these strategies are 
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needed. Further experimental studies demonstrating the causal role of inflated 
responsibility beliefs in the formation of OC symptoms would be useful as well as the 
inclusion of clinical samples.  
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Appendix A 
Head Teacher Invitation Letter 
 
School of Medicine, Health Policy and Practice 
Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
                                                                        
 
 
 
           University of East Anglia 
                                     
                  Norwich NR4 7TJ England 
                                       
                                                  Telephone 
                                               01603 593310 
 
                                              
                                                                        
 
 
Title of Project: The effect of responsibility on children’s moods, beliefs and behaviours. 
 
Dear Head Teacher,  
 
I am a trainee clinical psychologist on the Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology at the 
University of East Anglia. As part of the programme, I am required to undertake a research 
project for my thesis, which may result in a publication. I am writing to ask whether you would 
allow me to recruit some of the children in your school to participate in my research. 
 
What is the Research About? 
I am hoping to examine whether giving children different information about a sorting task 
affects their thoughts, feelings and behaviours. The aim is to help us understand more about the 
effect of responsibility on children.  
 
I want to test these ideas with children aged between 9 and 11 years old and their mothers. This 
is why your school is being contacted. The reason why this particular study only includes 
mothers and their children is because previous research has shown that mothers and fathers play 
a very different role in a child’s development. This means that it is important that we study the 
relationships of fathers and mothers with children separately. 
 
What Would it Involve? 
I need to recruit as many children as possible, which is why this research is being run in a 
number of different schools across the UK.  
 
If you decide that you would like your school to take part, information sheets and consent forms 
would be sent home to children in your school aged between 9-11. Mothers who are happy to 
take part in the study will fill in an enclosed consent form and return it to the school. I will then 
call these mothers to arrange a convenient time to meet with them and their child at their home. 
I will give the children information about the study so they can decide whether they want to take 
part or not. If they are happy to take part I will ask the children to answer some questions about 
how they are feeling (their current mood). I will also ask mothers to complete an information 
sheet about their child. With the mother present in the room, each child will be randomly 
assigned to one of two groups.   
 
Group 1:  Children will be asked to complete a short task, sorting sweets into containers, based 
on whether they contain nuts or not. In order to increase the child’s sense of responsibility, 
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children in this group will be told that the sweets they are sorting will be given to a group of 
children, one of whom has a nut allergy. They will be told that the experimenter will not check 
the sweets before they are given to the children and that it is therefore important that they sort 
the sweets as carefully as possible.  
 
Group 2: Children will simply be asked to complete a short task, sorting sweets into containers, 
based on what flavour they are.  
 
On completion of the task, all children will be fully debriefed.  Full information about the 
consequence of the sorting task will be provided. 
 
While they are sorting the sweets, I will take a video-recording of the child. Video-taping allows 
another trained researcher to check the reliability of the data. After the task, the child will be 
asked the same questions about their current mood. 
 
Confidentiality and Consent 
Data management will follow the Data Protection Act. Written records and the video tapes will 
be kept in a locked cupboard at the University of East Anglia. All the children and their mothers 
will be identified by unique identity numbers. I will not keep any identifiable information about 
children or their mothers. After the research has finished, the video tapes will be destroyed. 
 
Time 
The whole procedure, including the questions and short task, will take approximately 30 
minutes.  
 
Why Participate 
This is currently an under researched area. It is an opportunity to get involved in research that 
could contribute to improve our understanding of psychological difficulties in children. Also, 
for every child that participates in the study, a £3 book voucher will be given to their school. I 
will also be happy send your school the results of the study once they have been collected. 
 
What Next? 
The project has received approval from the Faculty of Health Research Ethics committee based 
at the University of East Anglia. The information sheets and consent forms provided to the 
children and their mothers do not state the fact that the sorted sweets will not really go to group 
of children, one of whom has a nut allergy. This is to preserve the reliability of the findings. 
Thus, it is important that this element of the study is not shared with the children involved until 
after the task has been completed. In line with ethics guidelines, as stated earlier, both the 
children and their mothers will be debriefed at the end of the task. This means they will become 
fully aware of the nature of the task. 
 
If you have any questions about the research, would like to arrange a meeting with me, or would 
like your students to be involved, please get in touch via the contact details above.  
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information. 
 
Yours sincerely,  
 
Melissa de Wolff 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
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Appendix B 
Information Regarding Participating Schools  
 All information was retrieved from the website of the Office for Standards in 
Education, Children’s Service and Skills (OFSTED) on 1st July 2010.  
School A  
 School A is a small primary school in a rural location. There are 88 pupils 
enrolled at the school, aged 4-10 years old. Very few are eligible for school meals and 
the number of pupils with special needs and/or disability is below average. OFSTED 
(2010) reported that few pupils come from minority ethnic families and most have 
English as their first language.  
School B  
 School B is a small school located in a small village in Cambridgeshire. There 
are 134 pupils enrolled at the school, aged 4-9. The school has a good reputation in the 
area and if often oversubscribed. OFSTED (2009) reported that most pupils are White 
British. There are a small number of pupils that have English as their second language 
but all these children are bi-lingual. The percentage of pupils with special need and/or 
disabilities is average and very few are eligible for school meals.  
School C 
 School C is a large primary school in a small village in Cambridgeshire. There 
are 323 children enrolled at the school, aged 4-11. OFSTED (2007) reported that a vast 
majority of the pupils there are White British and very are in the early stages of learning 
English. There is a higher than average proportion of pupils for Traveller families 
attending the school. Attainment on entry is broadly average as is the proportion of 
children who have learning difficulties and/or disabilities. The percentage of pupils 
eligible for school meals is below average. 
 153 
School D  
 School D is a very small school in a rural location. There are 61 pupils enrolled 
in the school, aged 4-11. OFSTED (2009) reported that 100% of the pupils are of White 
British heritage and the percentage of children eligible for free meals are below average. 
Attainment on entry is broadly average; however the proportion of pupils who have 
learning difficulties or disabilities is above average.   
School E  
 School E is an average sized junior school located in a small town in Norfolk. 
There are 246 pupils enrolled in the school, aged 7-11. OFTSED (2007) reported that 
most of the pupils are from White British backgrounds and few have English as their 
second language. The percentage of children eligible for free school meals is below 
average. Attainment on entry is higher than average and the proportion of children who 
have learning difficulties and/or disabilities are average.  
School F  
 School F is a large primary school situated in a large town in Cambridgeshire. 
There are 443 pupils enrolled in the school, aged 3-11. OFSTED (2009) reported that 
there is a wide variety of minority ethnic groups with 25 different languages spoken in 
the school. The percentage of pupils eligible for free meals is below average, as is the 
proportion of children who have learning difficulties and/or disabilities.  
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Appendix C 
Parent/Guardian Invitation Letter 
 
School of Medicine, Health Policy and Practice 
Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology 
 
                                                                       
 
 
                                                                      
 
 
 
         University of East Anglia 
                                     
                  Norwich NR4 7TJ England 
                                       
                                                  Telephone 
                                               01603 593310 
 
                                              
                                                                        
 
 
Date 05/01/2010 
Dear Parent, 
 
Title of Project: The effect of responsibility on children’s moods, beliefs and behaviours. 
 
We are writing to let you know about a research project we are carrying out and to 
invite you and your child to take part. This has been approved by your head teacher. The 
aim of this project is to test the short term effect of giving children different levels of 
responsibility for a task.  In previous research children have enjoyed taking part.  
 
One of the aims of this study is to investigate reassurance seeking behaviours. For this 
reason we ask for the child’s mother to be present during the task.  The reason why this 
particular study only includes mothers and their children is because previous research 
has shown that mothers and fathers play a very different role in a child’s development. 
This means that it is important that we study the relationships of fathers and mothers 
with children separately. 
 
Enclosed with this letter is some information about the research project. I would be 
grateful if you would take the time to read this, discuss it with your child and think 
about taking part. If you have any questions you can contact me on the number above.   
If you would like your child to take part, please sign the consent form and return this to 
the school office in the envelope provided. For every child who takes part in the 
research, a £3 book voucher will be donated to their school. 
 
With best wishes, 
 
Melissa de Wolff 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
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Appendix D 
Mother’s Information Letter  
 
School of Medicine, Health Policy and Practice 
Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
 
 
 
                                                                     
 
 
 
                                                               
                              Norwich NR4 7TJ England 
                                       
                                                  Telephone 
                                    01603 593310 
 
                                                       Fax 
                                    01603 593604 
                                              
                                                               
Title of Project:  The effect of responsibility on children’s mood, beliefs and 
behaviour.   
    Mother’s Information Sheet 
I would like to invite you and your child to take part in a research project. Before you 
decide if you would like to participate, you need to know why I am doing this research 
and what it will involve. Please take time to read this information carefully to help you 
decide whether or not you and your child would like to take part. Feel free to call me if 
you have any questions, or if you would like more information. Thank you for reading 
this. 
 
What is this project about? 
 
I am hoping to examine whether giving children different information about a sorting 
task affects their thoughts, feelings and behaviours. The aim is to help us understand 
more about the effect of responsibility in children.  
 
I want to test these ideas with children aged between 9 and 11 years old, who have not 
been identified as having psychological difficulties. This is why your child has been 
invited to take part. 
 
How will my child and I be involved? 
 
If you decide that you would like your child to take part, this is what will happen: 
 
1. You will fill in the enclosed consent form and return this to the school in the envelope 
provided. 
2. I will call you to arrange a convenient time to meet with you and your child at your 
home. During this telephone call you can ask me as many questions as you like. 
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3. When I visit your child at your home, I will give them information about the study so 
they can decide what to do. 
4. If they are happy to take part I will ask them to answer some questions about how they 
are feeling (their current mood).  
5. I will also ask you to complete an information sheet about your child. 
6. The procedure will take place at your home. With you present in the room, your child 
will be assigned to one of two groups. In one group children will be asked to complete a 
short task, sorting sweets into containers, based on whether they contain nuts or not.  
7. In the other group children will be asked to complete a short task, sorting sweets  into 
containers, based on what flavour they are. The task will take about 10 minutes to 
complete. At this stage, it is not possible to know which group your child would be in, 
as it will be decided on a random basis. 
8. During the task it is important that you do not become too involved in the task but 
respond to your child in the way you normally would.   
9. While they are sorting the sweets, I will take a video-recording of your child. I will time 
how long they take and count the number of times they check the sweets, hesitate, 
change their mind or ask reassurance from you. The video tape means that another 
person can check the reliability of the data. After we have recorded the data the tapes 
will be destroyed. 
10. After the task, your child will be asked the same questions about their current mood. 
11. The whole procedure, including the questions and short task will take approximately 
half an hour. 
 
Are there any risks to my child? 
It is very unlikely that the tasks will cause your child any upset. However, if your 
child did become upset in any way, the task would be stopped immediately. You 
will be able to comfort your child and distract them with a different activity. If your 
child seems to be experiencing higher than usual levels of anxiety, we can discuss 
the potential reasons for this together.  
 
What are the potential benefits? 
There will be no personal benefits for you or your child. However, this is an 
opportunity to get involved in research that could contribute to improve our 
understanding of psychological difficulties in children. For every child that 
participates in the study, a £3 book voucher will be given to their school. 
 
Will it affect my child’s care or education? 
No, your child’s care or education will not be affected in any way. This research is 
being carried out with the permission and co-operation of your child’s school. 
 
Can I change my mind? 
Yes. It is up to you and your child to decide whether or not to take part. You are 
both free to withdraw from the research at any time, without giving a reason. Your 
decisions about this will not affect the standard of care your child will receive. 
 
Who will have access to the results? 
Data management will follow the Data Protection Act. Written records and the 
video tapes will be kept in a locked cupboard at the University of East Anglia. All 
the children and their mothers will be identified by unique identity numbers. I will 
not keep any information about you or your child that could identify you to someone 
else. After the research has finished, the video tapes will be destroyed. 
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Who has reviewed the study? 
The Institute of Health Ethics Committee, at the University of East Anglia has 
reviewed and approved this research project. 
 
Who do I speak to if problems arise? 
If there is a problem please let me know. 
 
You can contact me at the following address: 
 
 Melissa de Wolff (Trainee Clinical Psychologist) 
 School of Medicine, Health Policy and Practice 
 University of East Anglia 
 NORWICH 
 NR4 7TJ  Tel: 01603 593310 
 
OK I want to take part – what do I do next? 
You need to fill in the enclosed consent form and return it to the school office in the 
envelope provided. Your child can only take part if you return this form to the 
school office. I will call you to arrange a convenient time to meet with you and your 
child at home.
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Appendix E 
Mother Consent Form 
 
School of Medicine, Health Policy and Practice 
Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
 
 
 
                                                                     
 
 
 
                                                               
                               Norwich NR4 7TJ England 
                                       
                                                  Telephone 
                                    01603 593310 
 
                                                       Fax 
                                    01603 593604 
                                              
                                                               
Participant Identification Number:  
   MOTHERS’ CONSENT FORM 
Title of Project:  The effect of responsibility on children’s mood, beliefs and 
behaviour.   
Name of Researcher: Melissa de Wolff 
         Please initial box 
 
 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the above study. 
 
2. I understand that my participation and my child's participation is voluntary and that I 
am free to withdraw my child and myself at any time without giving any reason and 
without our medical care or legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I understand that the research meeting will be recorded on video 
tape and that neither my child's name or my own will not be identified on the tape. 
Tapes will be destroyed at the end of the project. 
 
4. I agree that both my child and myself will take part in the above study. 
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Please complete the following: 
 
 
_____________________  _______________  _______________ 
Name of Child    Child's Date of Birth  Name of School 
 
______________________  _______________  _______________ 
Name of Mother   Date    Signature 
 
_____________________  ______________  ______________ 
Home Telephone Number  Mobile Number  Work Tel Number 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your help. 
 
 
 
Please return this consent form to the school office in the envelope provided. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Office use only 
 
____________________  ______________  _______________ 
Name of Researcher   Date     Signature 
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Appendix F 
Demographic Questionnaire for Mother.  
 
School of Medicine, Health Policy and Practice 
Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
 
 
 
                                                                     
 
 
 
                                                               
                                Norwich NR4 7TJ England 
                                       
                                                  Telephone 
                                    01603 593310 
 
                                                       Fax 
                                    01603 593604 
                                              
                                                               
Participant Identification Number:  
   DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
Title of Project:  The effect of responsibility on children’s mood, beliefs and 
behaviour.   
Name of Researcher: Melissa de Wolff 
Please complete the following information about your child by circling the 
appropriate response. 
 
 
1. Is your child a boy or a girl?      Boy / Girl 
 
2. How old is your child?        ____ years 
 
3. How would you describe your child’s ethnic group? (Please circle) 
 
White Mixed Asian or 
Asian British 
Black or 
Black British 
Chinese or 
other ethnic 
group 
British White & Black 
Caribbean 
Indian Caribbean Chinese 
Irish White & Black 
African 
Pakistani African Other Ethnic 
Group 
Other White White & Asian Bangladeshi Other Black 
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 Other Mixed 
 
Other Asian 
 
  
 
4. Is your child colour blind?     Yes / No / Don’t Know 
(We ask this as the task involves sorting things based on their colour) 
 
 
5. Does your child have any allergies?     Yes / No 
(We are interested in whether this will impact on the sorting task) 
 
If yes, what are they allergic to?                               ___________________________ 
 
6. Does anyone in your family have any allergies?    Yes / No 
 
If yes, what are they allergic to?                               ___________________________ 
 
Thank you for your help. 
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Appendix G 
Faculty of Health Ethics Committee Approval 
 The following page contains the ethical approval letter from the Institute of 
Health Committee, UEA. 
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Dear Melissa 
 
An Experimental Manipulation of Responsibility in Children: An 
investigation into the effects of inflated responsibility on reassurance 
seeking, checking behaviours and anxiety – 2009024 
 
The amendments to your above proposal have now been considered by the 
Chair of the FOH Ethics Committee and we can now confirm that your proposal 
has now been approved.  
 
Please can you ensure that any amendments to either the protocol or 
documents submitted are notified to us in advance and also that any adverse 
events that occur during your project are reported to the committee. Please 
could you also arrange to send us a report once your project is completed.  
 
The committee would like to wish you good luck in your project.  
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Dr. Jane Carter 
 
 
 
 
 
Melissa De Wolff 
93B Vinery Road 
Cambridge 
CB1 3DW 
 
28 September 2010 
 
Research Office, Room 1.09 
Chancellors Drive Annex 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich NR4 7TJ 
United Kingdom 
 
Email: Jane.Carter@uea.ac.uk 
Tel:  +44 (0) 1603 591023 
Fax: +44 (0) 1603 591132 
 
Web:www.uea.ac.uk 
Web: http://www.uea.ac.uk 
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Appendix H 
Child Information Sheet 
Child’s Information Sheet 
 
I am doing a research project and I would like to invite you to take part. 
Before you decide I would like you to read the following information.  
 
What is research? Why is this project being done? 
Research tries to find out the answers to questions. This project is to see if 
giving different groups of children different information about a task will 
affect how they feel. 
 
Why have I been asked to take part? 
This project is interested in children aged between 9 and 11 years old, 
which is why you have been asked to take part. 
 
What would I have to do? 
If you and your mother decide that you would like to take part, this is what 
will happen: 
• I will come and see you at your home. 
• I will ask you some questions about your feelings. 
• You will complete a task, which involves sorting sweets, which is 
not difficult. The task will take about 10 minutes for you to finish. 
• Your mum will also be in the room during this task. 
• During the task, you will be video-recorded. This is to check that I 
am recording things properly. The video tapes will be destroyed after 
I have finished with them. 
• I will ask you some more questions about your feelings after the task. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
You do not have to take part in this project and can change your mind at 
any time, without giving reason. 
 
Who will know what I said? 
Only people involved in this project will know what you say. If you tell me 
something that is worrying you then I might share it with your mother.  
 
If you have any more questions about this project then you can always get 
your Mum to give me a call and I will do my best to answer them. 
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Appendix I 
Child Assent Form 
 
School of Medicine, Health Policy and Practice 
Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
 
 
 
                                                                   
 
 
                                                               
                                  Norwich NR4 7TJ England 
                                       
                                                  Telephone 
                                    01603 593310 
 
                                                       Fax 
                                    01603 593604 
                                              
                                                               
Participant Identification Number:  
  CHILDREN’S ASSENT FORM 
 
Title of Project:  The effect of responsibility on children’s mood, beliefs and 
behaviour.   
Name of Researcher: Melissa de Wolff 
Please circle ‘Yes’ if you agree with the statements: 
 
Have you read (or had read to you) about this project?   Yes / No 
 
Do you understand what this project is about?    Yes / No 
 
Have you asked all the questions you want?    Yes / No 
 
Have you had your questions answered in a way you understand? Yes / No 
 
Do you understand it is OK to stop taking part at any time?  Yes / No 
 
Are you happy to take part?      Yes / No 
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If you do want to take part, please write your name and today’s date 
 
Name of child  __________________________ 
 
Date    __________________________ 
  
 
 
Researcher Name  Melissa de Wolff  
 
Signature   __________________________ 
 
Date    __________________________ 
 
 
Thank you for your help
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Appendix J 
The Spence Children’s Anxiety Scale (SCAS; Spence, 1998) 
SPENCE CHILDREN’S ANXIETY SCALE  
 
Your Name: _______________    Date: ____________ 
 
PLEASE TICK THE BOX UNDER THE WORD THAT SHOWS HOW OFTEN EACH OF THESE 
THINGS HAPPEN TO YOU. THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS.  
        Never   Sometimes   Often   Always 
1. I worry about things       
 
2. I am scared of the dark       
 
3. When I have a problem, I get a funny feeling in my stomach    
    
4. I feel afraid         
 
5. I would feel afraid of being on my own at home    
 
6. I feel scared when I have to take a test     
 
7. I feel afraid if I have to use public toilets or bathrooms   
 
8. I worry about being away from my parents 
   
9. I feel afraid that I will make a fool of myself in front of people       
10. I worry that I will do badly at my school work    
 
11. I am popular amongst other kids my own age    
 
12. I worry that something awful will happen to someone in my family    
    
13. I suddenly feel as if I can’t breathe when there is no reason for this    
    
14. I have to keep checking that I have done things right 
(like the switch is off, or the door is locked)    
 
15. I feel scared if I have to sleep on my own    
 
16. I have trouble going to school in the mornings because I feel nervous or afraid      
17. I am good at sports   
    
18. I am scared of dogs       
 
19. I can’t seem to get bad or silly thoughts out of my head   
 
20. When I have a problem, my heart beats really fast   
 
21. I suddenly start to tremble or shake when there is no reason for this    
    
22. I worry that something bad will happen to me    
 
23. I am scared of going to the doctors or dentists    
 
24. When I have a problem, I feel shaky     
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25. I am scared of being in high places or lifts (elevators)   
 
26. I am a good person       
 
27. I have to think of special thoughts to stop bad things 
from happening (like numbers or words)     
 
28 I feel scared if I have to travel in the car, or on a bus or a train       
 
29. I worry what other people think of me     
 
30. I am afraid of being in crowded places (like shoppingcentres,  
the movies, buses, busy playgrounds)    
 
31. I feel happy        
 
32. All of a sudden I feel really scared for no reason at all   
 
33. I am scared of insects or spiders     
 
34. I suddenly become dizzy or faint when there is no reason for this       
 
35. I feel afraid if I have to talk in front of my class    
 
36. My heart suddenly starts to beat too quickly for no reason     
     
37. I worry that I will suddenly get a scared feeling 
when there is nothing to be afraid of      
 
38. I like myself   
     
39. I am afraid of being in small closed places, like tunnels or small rooms   
    
40. I have to do some things over and over again (like washing my  
hands, cleaning or putting things in a certain order)      
   
41. I get bothered by bad or silly thoughts or pictures in my mind    
     
42. I have to do some things in just the right way to stop bad things happening   
     
43. I am proud of my school work      
 
44. I would feel scared if I had to stay away from home overnight    
    
45. Is there something else that you are really afraid of? YES NO  
 
Please write down what it is ___________________________________ 
 
How often are you afraid of this thing?  Never Sometimes Often Always  
 
 
C 1994 Susan H. Spence  
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Appendix K 
Children’s Responsibility Attitudes Scale (CRAS; Salkovskis & Williams, 2004) 
Children’s Responsibility Attitude Scale  
This questionnaire lists beliefs which people sometimes have.  Read each statement 
carefully and decide how much you agree or disagree with it. 
 
For each of the beliefs, put a circle round the words which BEST DESCRIBE HOW YOU THINK. 
Choose only one answer for each attitude.  Because people are different, there are no right 
or wrong answers. 
 
To decide whether a given attitude is like your way of looking at things, simply keep in 
mind what you are like MOST OF THE TIME. 
 
1. I often feel responsible for things that go wrong. 
2. If I think bad things, this is as bad as doing bad things. 
 
 
 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
 
3. I worry a lot about what might happen because of things that I do or don’t do.  
 
 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
 
4. Not stopping bad things happening is as bad as making them happen. 
 
 
 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
 
5. I should always try to stop harm happening, when I have thought it might. 
 
 
 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
 
6. I must always think through what might happen as a result of even the smallest 
things I do.  
 
 
 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
 
7. I often take responsibility for things which other people don’t think are my fault. 
 
 
 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
 
8. Everything I do can cause serious problems. 
 
 
 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
 
9. I often nearly cause harm 
 
 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
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10. I must protect others from harm. 
 
 
 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
 
11.  I should never cause even smallest amount of harm to others  
 
 
 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
 
12. I will be condemned for my actions. 
 
 
 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
 
13. I must try to stop bad things from happening, if there is any chance that what I do 
might make a difference. 
 
14. Doing nothing when bad things might happen is the same as making it happen. 
 
 
 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
 
15. You should never be careless, when what you do might affect someone else. 
 
 
 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
 
16. If I do nothing that can cause as much harm as doing something bad. 
 
 
 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
 
17. I can’t forgive myself, once I think it is possible that I have caused harm. 
 
18. Lots of things I have done, have been meant to prevent harm to others. 
 
 
 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
 
19. If I am careful enough then I can prevent any harmful accidents. 
 
 
 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
 
20. I often think that bad things will happen if I am not careful enough. 
 
 
 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
 
 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
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Appendix L 
The State Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children (STAIC; Spielberger, Edwards, Lushene, 
Montuori, & Platzek, 1973) 
DIRECTIONS: a number of statements which boys and girls use to describe themselves are 
given below. Read each statement carefully and decide how you feel right now. Then put an 
X in the box in front of the word or phrase which best describes how you feel. There are no 
right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement. Remember, find 
the word or phrase which best describes how your feel right now, at this very moment. 
1. I feel    very calm     calm     not calm 
 
2. I feel    very upset     upset     not upset 
 
3. I feel    very pleasant     pleasant    not pleasant 
 
4. I feel    very nervous     nervous    not nervous 
 
5. I feel    very jittery     jittery     not jittery 
 
6. I feel    very rested     rested     not rested 
 
7. I feel    very scared     scared    not scared 
 
8. I feel    very relaxed     relaxed    not relaxed 
 
9. I feel    very worried     worried    not worried 
 
10. I feel    very satisfied     satisfied    not satisfied 
 
11. I feel    very frightened    frightened    not frightened 
 
12. I feel    very happy     happy    not happy 
 
13. I feel    very sure     sure     not sure 
 
14. I feel    very good     good     not good 
 
15. I feel    very troubled     troubled    not troubled 
 
16. I feel    very bothered    bothered    not bothered 
 
17. I feel    very nice     nice     not nice 
 
18. I feel    very terrified     terrified    not terrified 
 
19. I feel    very mixed-up    mixed-up    not mixed up 
 
20. I feel    very cheerful     cheerful    not cheerful
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Appendix M 
Baseline and post-task measures of inflated responsibility  
I am interested in how you feel and what you think about the task you are about to do. 
Please read the following statements carefully and circle the number that shows how 
much you agree or disagree with the statements.  
 
0 Completely disagree 
1 Mostly disagree 
2 Neither agree or disagree 
3 Mostly agree 
4 Completely agree 
 
Completely 
disagree 
Mostly 
disagree 
Neither agree 
or disagree 
Mostly 
agree 
Completely 
agree 
It’s likely that something bad 
will happen 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Something really bad will 
happen now 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
It will be my fault if bad 
things happen 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Other people are likely to be 
harmed in some way 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Something really bad will 
happen to other people 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
I could cause something bad 
to happen to others 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
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I am interested in how you feel and what you think about the task you just completed. 
Please read the following statements carefully and circle the number that shows how 
much you agree or disagree with the statements.  
0 Completely disagree 
1 Mostly disagree 
2 Neither agree or disagree 
3 Mostly agree 
4 Completely agree 
 
Completely 
disagree 
Mostly 
disagree 
Neither agree or 
disagree 
Mostly 
agree 
Completely 
agree 
It’s likely that something bad 
will happen 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Something really bad will 
happen now 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
It will be my fault if bad 
things happen 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Other people are likely to be 
harmed in some way 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Something really bad will 
happen to other people 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
I could cause something bad 
to happen to others 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
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Appendix N 
Experimental task information (Adapted from Reeves et al., 2010) 
1. Tell the child: 
“I would like you to help me with some work that I am doing, which looks at how 
children of different ages think and behave. It is not a test and there are no right and 
wrong answers. I won’t be telling your teachers or your mum and dad about the 
answers you give, they are just for my project.” 
 
2. Give the child the information sheet to read and if they are happy to participate, give 
them the assent form to complete. 
 
3. Tell the child: 
“Before we start the task, I would like you to fill in some questionnaires about different 
feelings you might have. There are no right or wrong answers. We can fill these in 
together if you would like.” 
 
Give the child the SCAS, the RAS, the state form of the STAIC, and the measure of 
perceptions of responsibility, probability of harm and severity of harm. 
 
4. Tell the child: 
“We are now ready to start the task. Before we start I will read you some instructions. 
Firstly, do you know what a nut allergy is? (Child gives answer). I have some 
information to read to you about nut allergies: 
 
At least 1 in 50 children are allergic to nuts. If a child has a nut allergy and they eat a 
nut or even touch one, they will have an allergic reaction. This means that they will 
have a reaction such as sickness, swelling of the mouth, difficulties in swallowing, or 
they might collapse. It is very important that children with nut allergies do not eat or 
come into contact with nuts. 
 
5.Ask the child: 
“Do you know anyone who has a nut allergy? Have you ever seen anyone having an 
allergic reaction to either nuts or anything else?” 
 
6.Tell the child: 
“I will now read you the instructions for the task. It is not a test and you can ask me as 
many questions as you like. 
 
Task instructions will then be given to the child depending on whether they are in the 
high responsibility group. See below:   
 
Information Given to Children in the Increased Responsibility Group  
 
“Here are 120 sweets that have got all mixed up. The blue and green sweets contain 
nuts. The orange and gold sweets might contain nuts, as they were made in a factory 
where there are nuts. The brown and white sweets do not contain any nuts. Later on I 
will be giving the sweets to some children where one child has a nut allergy. Therefore I 
would like you to sort the sweets based on whether they have nuts in them or not. 
175     
 
I would like you to sort the sweets, by putting them into these bowls. Put all the sweets 
with nuts (blue and green sweets) into this bowl, all the sweets that might contain nuts 
(orange and gold sweets) into this bowl and all the sweets without nuts (brown and 
white sweets) into this bowl. I have written it out on this paper to remind you. Take one 
sweet at a time without looking in the bag. Work as quickly and as carefully as you can. 
 
If you are not sure, you can check the bowls and change the sweets as many times as 
you want. No one else will be able to check how you have sorted the sweets before 
giving them to the children. Therefore it is important that you sort the sweets as 
carefully as possible”. 
 
Information Given to Children in the Control Group 
 
“Here are 120 sweets that have got all mixed up. The blue and green sweets are mint 
flavour, the orange and gold sweets are fruit flavour, the brown and white sweets are 
chocolate flavour. I would like you to sort the sweets based on what flavour they are. 
 
I would like you to sort the sweets, by putting them into these bowls. Put all the mint 
flavoured sweets (blue and green sweets) into this bowl, all the fruit flavoured sweets 
(orange and gold sweets) into this bowl and all the chocolate flavoured sweets (brown 
and white sweets) into this bowl. I have written it out on this paper to remind you. Take 
one sweet at a time without looking in the bag. Work as quickly and as carefully as you 
can.  
 
If you are not sure, you can check the bowls and change the sweets as many times as 
you want”. 
 
7. Ask the child: 
“Are you clear what you need to do? Can you explain to me what you need to do, so 
that I can check I have been clear? Do you have any questions? Tell me when you have 
finished the task.” 
 
9. After the task has finished, ask the child: 
“Do you want to change any of the sweets into other bowls?” 
 
10. After the task, ask the child to complete the STAIC and the measure of perceptions 
of responsibility, probability of harm and severity of harm: 
“Before we finish, I would like you to fill in 2 questionnaires that you saw earlier.” 
11. Debriefing – Tell the child that the task is now finished. Ask whether they found the 
task easy or hard, or whether it made them think about anything in particular. Inform the 
child that the researcher will not be giving the sweets to any children later and the study 
was just interested in how giving them this information made them feel and whether it 
changed how they did the task. Ask if they have any questions and finally thank the 
child for taking part.  
 
 
